

Lobbying Expenditures on Migration: A Descriptive Analysis¹

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| Giovanni Facchini ² | Anna Maria Mayda ³ | Prachi Mishra ⁴ |
| University of Nottingham and CEPR | Georgetown University and CEPR | International Monetary Fund |

Abstract

In this paper we carry out a descriptive analysis of lobbying expenditures on migration policy in the United States, *both across sectors and across firms*. The dataset we use is developed by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) and allows us to identify firms' lobbying expenditures by targeted policy area. In other words, we have information on lobbying expenditures that are specifically channeled towards shaping immigration policy.

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² School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, United Kingdom. Email: Giovanni.Facchini@nottingham.ac.uk.

³ Corresponding author. Department of Economics and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 20057, USA. Email: amm223@georgetown.edu.

⁴ International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, 20431, USA. Email: pmishra@imf.org.

1. Introduction

Only a small minority of voters in the main destination countries of immigrant flows favours more open migration policies. Based on the National Identity Module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), in 1995, less than 10 percent of respondents was in favour of increasing the number of immigrants to their country.⁵ The fraction of voters in favour of further immigration was also very low in 2003 (Mayda 2006). According to the ISSP survey carried out in that year,⁶ only 11 percent of respondents was in favour of increasing the number of immigrants to their country (Facchini and Mayda 2008).⁷ More recently, a survey carried out by the German Marshall Fund revealed that, in 2011, in five European countries⁸ only 4 percent of the population felt that there were too few immigrants in their country – i.e., only 4 percent of the population was presumably in favour of increasing the number of immigrants to their country – while 47 percent felt that there were too many of them.⁹

Given the extent of opposition to immigration revealed by public opinion surveys, one might wonder why governments allow migration to take place *at all*. In fact a simple median-voter model,¹⁰ applied to the voters' preferences we observe in the data, would predict close-to-zero flows, while actual arrivals are non trivial in number. How can this “public opinion puzzle” – as has been labeled in the political science literature (Freeman 1992, Joppke 1998) – be explained? Why are policy-makers willing to let the size of migration be much larger than desired by the majority of their voters? One very likely explanation of the discrepancy between voters' opinions and the actual size of migration flows is that the political process through which heterogeneous voters' preferences are aggregated is richer than a simple referendum (where each voter has the same weight). In particular domestic interest groups, many of which are pro-migration, are likely to play

⁵ The 1995 ISSP survey covered more than 20 high- and middle-income countries.

⁶ The 2003 ISSP survey covered 33 high- and middle-income countries.

⁷ In particular, in the United States, the fraction of voters in favor of increasing the number of immigrants to the US was 8% in 1995 and 10% in 2003.

⁸ France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom.

⁹ The corresponding percentages in the United States were in the same year 4% and 44%.

¹⁰ In the median voter model, policies are chosen according to the preferences of the majority (for example, in a referendum).

an important role.¹¹ In fact, there is abundant anecdotal evidence supporting this view, as described in the following examples.

In the past, active subsidization of immigration has been demanded and obtained by business associations in many labor-scarce countries, as documented by Timmer and Williamson (1996). In her study of the political economy of the introduction of the 1917 Literacy Test provision in the U.S., Goldin (1994) points out that capital owners were against this restrictive measure and actively lobbied against it.

The position of business lobbies in favor of migration is also consistent with more recent anecdotal evidence, both in the U.S. and in Europe. For instance, during the “dot com” boom at the end of the nineties, high tech firms have intensively and successfully lobbied the U.S. Congress to increase the number of H1-B visas.¹² More recently, U.S. hospitals and healthcare providers have been able to secure, through their lobbying, an increase in the number of H1-C visas awarded to foreign nurses. Finally, after the 2006 U.S. midterm elections, the vice-president of Technet, a lobbying group for technology companies, stressed that the main goal of the reforms proposed by her group was the relaxation of migration policy constraints.¹³

New visa categories have also been introduced in the U.S. as the result of lobbying activities. An interesting example is the case of H2-R visas in the United States. In 2005, the quota for H2-B visas was filled with none of them going to the seafood industry in Maryland.¹⁴ This industry started heavy lobbying of the Maryland senator Barbara A. Mikulski, who was able to add a last-minute amendment to the Tsunami Relief Act (P.L. 109-13) of May 11, 2005 (Cox News May 4, 2006). As a result, a new visa category was introduced, H2-R visas. The requirements for H2-R visas are the same as for H2-B visas, but there is no quota. As long as the individual has held an H2-B visa

¹¹ Note that, in standard labor-economics models, immigration produces net gains in the destination country as gains to the capital owners from cheap labor outweigh losses to the workers (see, for example, Borjas 1995). Therefore, another explanation of the public opinion puzzle is that, besides political considerations, policymakers also care about social welfare.

¹² Goldsborough (2000) writes: “Immigration policy today is driven by businesses that need more workers, skilled and unskilled, legal and illegal [...] During the annual debate on H1-B visas two years ago, Silicon Valley executives trooped before Congress, warning of a Y2K computer disaster unless the number of H1B visas was increased.”

¹³ CIO, December 19 2006, available at <http://www.cio.com/article/27581/>

¹⁴ H2-B visas are for temporary workers in unskilled, seasonal, non-agricultural occupations (for example, in the planting-pine-trees industry; the resort industry, the seafood industry, the gardening industry in the North of the United States, etc.).

in one of the previous three fiscal years, he can get an H2-R visa. This has substantially expanded the number of temporary, non-agricultural workers allowed to enter the country.

In Europe, pro-migration business interest groups appear to play a similar role. For example, in the UK, associations like the Business for New Europe group (BNE)¹⁵ have issued statements suggesting that “...the UK should continue with its open door policy”, in the eve of the discussion on introducing a cap on migration from Bulgaria and Romania, once the two countries became members of the European Union (Agence France Press, August 30 2006).

Note that not all interest groups are in favor of migration. Labor unions, for example, have historically been an important political force against free migration. However, the evidence in the literature is that anti-migration lobbying by interest groups has become less effective over time.¹⁶

While anecdotal evidence on the role played by interest groups lobbying is abundant, systematic empirical analyses are scarce. The only studies in the literature which empirically investigate the political economy of migration policy, with a specific focus on lobbying activity, are Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001), Facchini and Mayda (2008), Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011) and Kerr, Lincoln and Mishra (2013). (details of each paper are described in Section 2.). In particular, Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011) analyze the impact of lobbying activity on migration policy in the U.S. using a newly available dataset on lobbying expenditures on immigration. While the dataset provides information at the firm level, Facchini, Mayda and Mishra only focus on variation across sectors (since data on the number of visas – which they use as the dependent variable – and on other relevant economic variables are only available at the sector level).

In this paper, we use the same dataset as Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011) and carry out a descriptive analysis of lobbying expenditures on migration policy, in the United States, *both across sectors and across firms*. The dataset, developed by the Center

¹⁵ This is a UK based pressure group. The heads of the supermarket chain Sainsburys and the head of the European division of the investment bank Merrill Lynch were among the signatories.

¹⁶ See, for example, Facchini and Mayda (2008). This paper’s results are consistent with the fact that, in recent years, U.S. labor unions have substantially toned down the rhetoric against migration.

for Responsive Politics (CRP), allows us to identify firms' lobbying expenditures by targeted policy area. In other words, it provides information on lobbying expenditures that are specifically channeled towards shaping immigration policy. This represents a significant improvement in the quality of the data relative to the previous literature which has used, instead, political action committees (PAC) campaign contributions.¹⁷ First, PAC contributions represent only a small fraction (10%) of targeted political activity, the remainder being made up by lobbying expenditures. Second, PAC contributions cannot be disaggregated by issue and, thus, cannot be easily linked to a particular policy.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews papers in the literature which focus on the political economy of migration policy in general and, in particular, on the role played by interest groups. Section 3 describes the dataset on lobbying expenditures on migration. Section 4 carries out the descriptive analysis of the dataset on lobbying expenditures. Finally, Section 5 concludes.

2. Related Literature

The literature on the political economy of migration policy is very thin and mainly theoretical. Benhabib (1996) and Ortega (2005) develop models in which immigration policy is the outcome of majority voting, while Facchini and Willman (2005) and Epstein and Nizan (2006) theoretically focus on the role played by pressure groups.

In a seminal contribution, Benhabib (1996) considers the human capital requirements that would be imposed on potential immigrants by an income-maximizing polity under majority voting. Output is modeled using a constant returns to scale production function combining labor with human and/or physical capital. The median voter chooses to admit individuals who supply a set of factors that are complementary to her own endowment. As a result, if the median voter is unskilled, he will choose a policy that sets a lower bound on the human-capital labor ratio of the immigrants, that is only skilled foreigners will be admitted. On the other hand, if the median voter is highly educated, he will set an upper bound on the skill level of the immigrants, and thus will be in favor of admitting only individuals with low levels of education. Since in practice it is

¹⁷ See for example Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000).

difficult to enforce this upper bound, the policy chosen by a skilled median voter is likely to be free migration. The main shortcoming of this analysis is that the constant returns to scale assumption might lead to counterintuitive results. In fact, while the optimal policy prescribes bounds on the skill profiles of the individuals to be admitted, it does not say anything about the actual size of the inflows. This is clearly at odds with the policies followed by countries around the world.

A different solution to this problem has been proposed by Ortega (2005), who extends Benhabib's model to a dynamic setting to explore the trade off between the short run economic impact of immigration and its medium to long run political effect.¹⁸ In particular, while immigration has an impact only on the labor market in the current period, in the future it also affects the political balance of the destination country, as the descendants of migrants gain the right to vote. As a result, on the one hand, skilled natives prefer an immigration policy that admits unskilled foreign workers since, due to complementarities in production, this policy increases skilled wages. On the other, the arrival of unskilled immigrants and the persistency of skill levels across generations can give rise to a situation in which unskilled workers gain the political majority and, therefore, vote for policies that benefit them as a group. Thus, through the political channel, skilled natives (and a skilled median voter) prefer an immigration policy that admits skilled foreign workers. The interplay between these two forces allows Ortega to characterize the equilibrium migration quotas, i.e. to derive a prediction in terms of the size of migration inflows.

The paper that is most closely related to our analysis is Facchini and Willmann (2005). Using the menu auction framework pioneered by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the authors model the determination of policies towards international factor mobility as the result of the interaction between organized groups and an elected politician. Using a one-good multiple factors framework, the model highlights how policies depend on both whether a production factor is represented or not by a lobby and on the degree of substitutability/complementarity between factors.

A small theoretical literature has also emerged explicitly modeling the role played by organized groups in shaping migration policy in a setting with imperfectly competitive

¹⁸ See also Ortega (2010).

factor markets. Amegashie (2004) models migration policy as the result of an all pay auction in which the auctioneer is represented by the government and the participants are a firm and a union. Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (2008) consider instead a model in which entrepreneurs and a union interact with an elected politician to determine the number of foreign workers to be admitted. Their main result is that, if the government chooses the level of immigration to maximize a weighted average of the welfare of workers and entrepreneurs, the presence of a union ends up hurting the very same workers which the union is meant to represent and protect. This result is based on a second best argument: the government attempts to reduce the labor market distortion introduced by the union by allowing a number of immigrants in the country that is larger than the one it would have admitted in the presence of a competitive labor market. This leads to a reduction in the union wage that can no longer compensate workers for the unemployment risk generated by the presence of the union.

From an empirical point of view, very few papers focus on political-economy determinants of migration policy. Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) investigate the determinants of the voting behaviour of House members on immigration policy measures introduced in the United States between 1973 and 2006. This paper uncovers the important role played by the labor market characteristics of the district electing the representative. Other studies investigate the role of lobbying, using data at the industry or occupational level. Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011) offer the first systematic empirical analysis of the role of interest groups in shaping contemporary U.S. immigration policy. Using a newly available dataset, in which lobbying expenditures can be directly linked to immigration policies, the paper finds that sectors where pro-immigration business groups are more active (i.e. contribute more) tend to be allocated a larger number of work and related visas. On the other hand, in sectors in which anti-immigration labour unions are more powerful, lower numbers of immigrants are admitted. The estimates of the paper suggest that a 10% increase in the size of migration lobbying expenditures (per native worker) by business groups is associated with a 3.1% larger number of visas (per native worker), while a one-percentage-point increase in union density – for example, moving from 10 to 11 percentage points, which amounts to a 10% increase in the union membership rate – reduces it by 3.1%. The results are robust

to endogeneity concerns, which are addressed by introducing a number of industry-level control variables (e.g. output, prices, origin country effects, etc.), by performing a falsification exercise and, finally, by using an instrumental-variable estimation strategy.

Facchini and Mayda (2008) focus, instead, on cleavages across occupation/skill lines, rather than across sectors. Using a panel covering the period 1994-2005 and differentiating labour according to both skill levels and occupations, the paper finds systematic evidence suggesting that the lobbying activity of organized labour leads to a reduction in the inflow of foreign workers in the same occupation/education cell – this effect is driven by substitutability – and to an increase in the inflow of foreign workers in different occupation/education cells – this effect is driven by complementarity. This suggests that, for example, politically-organized doctors will lobby the government and succeed in decreasing the number of foreign doctors to the U.S. and in increasing the number of foreign nurses. Another paper that provides *indirect* empirical evidence on the role played by lobbying in shaping U.S. migration policy is Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001). Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) focus on U.S. border enforcement and show that it softens when sectors using illegal immigrants expand. The authors suggest that “sectors that benefit greatly from lower border enforcement, such as apparel and agriculture, lobby heavily on the issue, while remaining sectors that benefit modestly or not at all are politically inactive.” (page 636).

Finally, unlike other empirical studies which focus on the effect of lobbying on outcomes, Kerr, Lincoln, and Mishra (2013) analyze the determinants of lobbying and are among the first to provide systematic evidence on the dynamics of lobbying activities. The paper finds evidence of persistence, i.e. whether or not a firm lobbied in the past has a significant effect on whether it lobbies in the current period. A priori, there are reasons to believe that lobbying should exhibit significant entry and exit over time.¹⁹ However, this is not what the authors find. The authors argue that this persistence is due to the barriers to entry that firms face. They test this argument using a number of different estimation approaches. They also study how firms respond to a predetermined policy change, i.e. the expiration of the increase in the H-1B visas cap that occurred in 2004.

¹⁹ For example, the maxim that “a week is a lifetime in politics” suggests that firms might only lobby when legislation directly affecting them is actively being considered.

The data shows that firms dependent on skilled immigration adjust their lobbying behaviour towards immigration-specific issues in response to the decline. On the other hand, firms that were not previously lobbying do not start lobbying in response to the policy shift.

To conclude, very few works have focused on the political economy of migration policy, especially from an empirical point of view. This is even more surprising if we compare migration to another facet of international economic integration, namely international trade. A vast theoretical and empirical literature considers the political-economy determinants of *trade* policy, trying to understand the forces that work against and in favor of free trade.²⁰ This is in spite of the fact that, as trade restrictions have been drastically reduced, the benefits from elimination of existing trade barriers are much smaller than the gains that could be achieved by freeing international migration.²¹ In other words, work on the political economy of migration is likely to have greater returns than work on the political economy of free trade.

3. Data on lobbying expenditures

In the United States, special interest groups can legally influence the policy formation process by offering campaign contributions to political candidates for election purposes or by hiring lobbying firms which lobby incumbent members of Congress and of federal agencies on their behalf. Starting already in 1911, after a vigorous campaign initiated by President Theodore Roosevelt to limit the influence of business in politics, legislation has been passed to require disclosure of contributions directed to political candidates for campaign purposes (Ansolabehere, de Figueredo, and Snyder 2003). The data on campaign contributions have been widely used in the international economics and political science literatures and are collected by the Federal Election Commission.

The activities of lobbying firms have instead remained much more obscure. Only in 1995, with the introduction of the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), lobbying firms and their clients have been required to provide a substantial amount of information on their

²⁰ See Rodrik (1995), Helpman (1997) and Gawande and Krishna (2003) for excellent surveys of the trade literature.

²¹ A recent World Bank study estimates that the benefits to poor countries of rich countries allowing only a 3 percent rise in their labor force by relaxing migration restrictions is US\$300 billion per year (Pritchett 2006).

government relations activities. In particular, starting from 1996 all lobbyists must file semi-annual reports with the Secretary of the Senate's Office of Public Records (SOPR), listing the name of each client (either a firm, a labor union or other organization) and the total income they have received from each of them. At the same time, all firms (or labor unions or other organizations) with in-house lobbying departments are asked to file similar reports to the SOPR. Importantly, legislation requires the disclosure not only of the dollar amounts actually received/spent, but also of the (general) policy issues for which lobbying has taken place. Table A1 in the Appendix shows a list of 76 (general) issues at least one of which has to be entered by the filer. The filer can list more than one issue. In that case, it has to use a separate page of the form for each code selected. The list of issues includes immigration (IMM), trade (TRD), etc.²² For each general issue, the filer also lists the specific issue(s) for which it lobbied during the semi-annual period (for example, specific issues could be particular bills before Congress or specific executive branch actions).²³

Lobbying firms are required to provide a good-faith estimate, which can be rounded to the nearest \$20,000, of all lobbying-related income in each six-month period. Likewise, firms with in-house lobbying departments are required to provide a good-faith estimate, which can be rounded to the nearest \$20,000, of all lobbying-related expenditures in a six-month period. A lobbying firm or organization that receives/spends less than \$10,000 in any six-month period does not have to state its income/expenditures. If lobbying is not disclosed in such cases, the figure is reported as zero. However, as Kerr, Lincoln, and Mishra (2013) argue, the measurement error induced by reporting requirements is likely to be minimal.

The data on lobbying incomes/expenditures are compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) in Washington D.C. using the semi-annual lobbying

²² Surprisingly, the list of issues also includes names of some industries, e.g. apparel, computer, tobacco etc.

²³ According to the Lobbying Disclosure Act, the term “lobbying activities” refers to “lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, including preparation and planning activities, research and other background work that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of others.” Lobbying could take place by setting up an in-house lobbying department or by hiring external consultants. While setting up a whole office for in-house operations is likely more expensive, if a firm employs a lobbyist externally the new hire still has to spend a significant amount of time learning the particular needs and characteristics of their new client and how items currently on the agenda will affect them specifically.

disclosure reports filed with SOPR and posted to its website (www.crp.org). The reports used in this paper cover lobbying activity that took place from 1998 through 2005. Annual lobbying incomes and expenditures are calculated by adding mid-year totals and year-end totals. Whenever a lobbying report is amended, income/expense figures from the amendment are generally used instead of those from the original filing. Often, however, CRP staff determines that the income/expense figures on the amendment or termination report are not accurate. In those instances, figures from the original filing are used.

Occasionally, income that an outside lobbying firm reports receiving from a client is greater than the client's reported lobbying expenditures. Many such discrepancies can be explained by the fact that the client and the outside firm use different filing methods (see Appendix at the end of the paper for a detailed description of different filing methods). When both organizations use the same method, discrepancies are generally due to filer error. In cases not already resolved in previous reports and where the discrepancy exceeds the \$20,000 that can be attributed to rounding, the client's expenditures rather than the lobbying firm's reported income are used. The only exception is when a client reports no lobbying expenditures, while the outside lobbying firm lists an actual payment. In such cases, the figure reported by the lobbying firm is used.

In cases where the data appear to contain errors, official Senate records are consulted and, when necessary, the CRP contacts SOPR or the lobbying organizations for clarification. The CRP standardizes variations in names of individuals and organizations to clearly identify them and more accurately represent their total lobbying expenditures.²⁴

Table A2 in the Appendix shows a sample form filled by Microsoft for lobbying activity between January-June 2005. Only three selected pages of the form are shown in the appendix. Page 1 of the form shows the name and details of Microsoft, the time period covered by the report (January 1 – June 30, 2005) and the expenses incurred by Microsoft for lobbying activity during this period (US\$4.5 million). The lobbying expenditure is listed once on the first page of the form and the amount is not split

²⁴ In addition, in cases where both a parent and its subsidiary organizations lobby or hire lobbyists, the Center attributes lobbying spending to the parent organization. Therefore, the lobbying totals reported by the Center for a parent organization may not reflect its original filing with the Senate, but rather the combined expenditures of all related entities. Moreover, when companies merge within any two-year election cycle, their lobbying expenditures are combined and attributed to the new entity.

between the issues. Microsoft lists “Method C” as the reporting method, i.e. reported amounts use the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) definition of lobbying activities. This method is available to any registrant that is subject to Section 162(e) of the IRC (see Appendix at the end of the paper for a discussion of this point).²⁵

The other two pages of the form in Table A2 show two *general* issues for which Microsoft engaged in lobbying activity during the six-month period – immigration (IMM) and trade (TRD). Microsoft lists seven other issues in its report – e.g., taxation (TAX) – which are not shown in the appendix table. For immigration, the *specific* issues listed by Microsoft are H1-B visas, L1 visas and Program Electronic Review Management (PERM) regulations. For trade, some of the specific issues listed include the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States FTA Implementation Act, software piracy and procurement issues in China, interpretation and enforcement of WTO agreement on intellectual property (TRIPS), etc.

As mentioned in the Introduction, the availability of lobbying expenditure data represent a significant improvement in the quality of the data relative to the previous literature which has used, instead, political action committees (PAC) campaign contributions. As shown in Table 1, between 1999 and 2004²⁶, interest groups have spent on average about 3.8 billion U.S. dollars per political cycle on targeted political activity, which includes PAC campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures.²⁷ Lobbying expenditures represent by far the bulk of all interest groups money (close to ninety percent). Therefore, there are two advantages in using lobbying expenditures rather than PAC contributions to capture the intensity of the activity of pressure groups. First, PAC contributions represent only a small fraction of interest groups’ targeted political activity

²⁵ The grass-roots and state lobbying expenses are not subtracted from this amount.

²⁶ Table 1 and Figure 1 are based on data for the full political cycles included in the 1998-2005 period, i.e. the 1999-2000, the 2001-2002 and the 2003-2004 political cycles.

²⁷ We follow the literature that excludes, from targeted-political-activity figures, “soft money” contributions, which went to parties for general party-building activities not directly related to Federal campaigns; in addition, soft money contributions cannot be associated with any particular interest or issue (see Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 2000 and Tripathi, Ansolabehere, and Snyder 2002). Soft money contributions have been banned by the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.

(10 percent). Second, linking campaign contributions to particular policy issues is very difficult and often requires some ad-hoc assumptions.²⁸

The importance of doing so is shown in Figure 1 – which is based on averages over the three election cycles – where in the left panel there is a scatter plot of overall lobbying expenditures (i.e. on all issues) and PAC contributions, while in the right panel there is a scatter plot of lobbying expenditures associated with immigration policy²⁹ and PAC contributions. The left panel shows a positive and significant correlation between overall (i.e., on any issue) lobbying expenditures and PAC contributions across sectors. This result is consistent with the political science literature and may suggest that PAC contributions are integral to groups’ lobbying efforts, i.e. they allow them to gain access to policymakers (Tripathi, Ansolabehere, and Snyder 2002). In contrast, the very low correlation between PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures for migration policy, in the right panel, is striking. It suggests that, if we were to use the data on PAC contributions as a proxy for interest groups’ activity on migration policy, we would obtain misleading results.

Further details about the construction of the dataset on lobbying expenditures are discussed in the Appendix.

4. Descriptive analysis of the data on lobbying expenditures

In this paper, we use data at the firm-level on lobbying expenditures of clients (i.e., firms, labor unions or other organizations) from the CRP dataset. In the case of a client which “self-files” (i.e., a client with an in-house lobbying department), the CRP uses the figure in its report, which includes both in-house and external lobbying expenditures for the period. In the case of a client which does not “self-file,” the CRP uses the sum of its contracts with outside lobbying firms to represent its lobbying expenditures for the period.

Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the evolution of lobbying expenditures over time. Figure 2 shows “overall lobbying expenditures”, Figure 3 shows “total lobbying expenditures”

²⁸ For instance, in their pioneering work on the estimation of Grossman and Helpman (1994) protection for sale model, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) have used threshold levels for PAC expenditures to identify whether a sector is politically organized or not, from the point of view of trade policy determination.

²⁹ In the terminology of the following section, these correspond to “total lobbying expenditures.”

and Figure 4 shows “lobbying expenditures on migration”. The “overall lobbying expenditures” are equal to the sum of firm-level lobbying expenditures on *any issue of all firms/business associations/unions* in all industries, year by year. Thus, this is a measure of how aggressively firms carry out lobbying activity in general. The “total lobbying expenditures” are equal to the sum of firm-level lobbying expenditures on *any issue of firms/business associations/unions spending money on immigration* in all industries, year by year. The “lobbying expenditures on migration” are equal to the sum of firm-level lobbying expenditures *on migration of firms/business associations/unions spending money on immigration* in all industries, year by year. In other words, the “lobbying expenditures on migration” are calculated using a two-step procedure. First, only those firms are considered which list “immigration” as an issue in their lobbying report. Second, the total expenditure of these firms is split equally among the issues they lobbied for.³⁰ “Lobbying expenditures on migration” represent the most direct measure of lobbying activity related to immigration policy. On the other hand, “total lobbying expenditures” represent an upper bound of lobbying expenditures on migration, since they include all expenditures (i.e. on any issue) of firms spending money on immigration.³¹ The motivation for interpreting “total lobbying expenditures” as an upper bound of lobbying expenditures on migration is that lobbying expenditures are to a certain extent fungible across issues.

Overall lobbying expenditures have grown by more than 50% from US\$1.4 bn in 1998 to US\$2.3 bn in 2005. According to Figure 2, the increase has been steady over the years. Total lobbying expenditures have grown by approximately 15% from US\$196 mn in 1998 to US\$227 mn in 2005. Figure 3 shows an irregular pattern over the 1998-2005 period. For example, total lobbying expenditures decreased over the 2001-2003 years and only came back to the initial values in 2004. Finally, lobbying expenditures on migration have grown by more than 25 percent from US\$18 mn in 1998 to US\$23 mn in 2005. Figure 4 shows again an irregular pattern, with a decrease in lobbying for migration around the 2001-2003 years.

³⁰ Recall that the lobbying expenditure of a firm is listed only once in the lobbying report, on the first page, and the amount is not split between the issues the firm lobbies for. Thus, to be as neutral as possible, we split the total amount on the first page equally among issues.

³¹ Figures 3 and 4 use data from the fourth column (sum) of Tables 2 and 4, respectively.

It is not clear how to interpret the decrease in interest groups' activity on migration policy between 2001 and 2003. One possibility is that this decrease is due to the September 11 attacks, which likely affected migration political-economy dynamics. Alternatively, the decrease over 2001-2003, followed by the increase in 2004-2005, could be related to the changes in the H1-B visa quotas over those years. The national cap in H1-B visas was 115,000 in 2000, 195,000 in 2001-2003, 65,000 in 2004 and 85,000 in 2005. Thus these few years of data suggest that lobbying expenditures on migration were low in the years in which the H1-B cap was high and vice versa but, also, that the H1-B cap was high when previous years' lobbying expenditures on migration were high and vice versa. Both the robustness of these patterns and the direction of causality are beyond the scope of this paper and should be analyzed in future research (see, for example, Kerr, Lincoln and Mishra 2013).

Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 provide more detailed information on lobbying activity on immigration, year by year. These tables focus on the restricted sample of firms/business associations/unions ("firms", broadly speaking) which wrote down immigration as an issue in their lobbying report in the years included between 1998 and 2005. Over the entire period, firms hired lobbyists for migration purposes 1662 times (some of these observations correspond to the same firm in different years). For example, in 1998 there were 220 firms which hired lobbyists for migration purposes. This number went up and down over the years (notably it decreased to 179 firms in 2001) and increased back up to 267 firms in the final year, i.e. 2005. According to Table 2, over this period, on average a firm in this sample spent approximately US\$790,000 on lobbying in a given year. Note that this number – as clarified above – includes lobbying *on any issue* of these firms ("total lobbying expenditures"), i.e. it is an upper bound of how much a firm in this sample spent for migration lobbying. Table 4 gives instead information, more specifically, on "lobbying expenditures *on migration*" of the same group of firms. Over this period, on average a firm in this sample spent approximately US\$78,000 on lobbying in a given year. We will focus our comments on Table 4 since it provides the most direct evidence on migration lobbying. Between 1998 and 2005, a total of US\$130 mn were spent on lobbying specifically targeted at shaping US migration policy. Over the same period, the maximum amount a firm spent on migration lobbying in a given year was

approximately US\$2.2 mn (see the maximum column). Over the same period, a firm spent as little as \$690 in a given year (see the minimum column).

Table 3 provides information on the number of policy issues which “firms” – spending money on immigration – did lobbying on, in the 1998-2005 period, year by year. So, for example, over this period, on average a firm in this sample lobbied on approximately 10 policy issues in a given year. This number went up to 12 policy issues in 2002. Interestingly, a firm in this sample lobbied on as many as 39 policy issues in a given year (see the maximum column) and on as few as one issue in a given year (i.e., migration) (see minimum column). Thus, this table tells us that firms can be very diversified in terms of the specific aspects of policymaking which they want to affect through lobbying.

Table 5 focuses on an even more restricted sample, i.e. “firms” spending lobbying money *only* on immigration. In other words, these are the firms which write down only migration as a policy issue in their lobbying report. Over the 1998-2005 period, there are 98 (annual) lobbying reports which are specific to migration policy. For example, in 1998 there were 12 firms who hired lobbyists exclusively for migration purposes. This number went up to 18 in 2005. On average, between 1998 and 2005, “firms” spending lobbying money *only* on immigration spent approximately US\$120,000 in a given year. If we compare this number to the corresponding number in Table 4, i.e. approximately US\$78,000, we can see that lobbying expenditures on migration of firms exclusively interested in migration policy are higher than for firms doing lobbying on migration *and* other issues. The figures in Table 5 are important because they give us the exact expenditure on migration of this group of firms, i.e. these values are not affected by even splitting (see footnote 28).

The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) matches each firm in its dataset to an industry. Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 show summary statistics by sector – using the CRP industry classification – on average over the 1998-2005 period. These tables again focus on the restricted sample of “firms” which wrote down immigration as an issue in their lobbying report in the years included between 1998 and 2005. Table 6 presents figures for “total lobbying expenditures” while Table 8 shows values for “lobbying expenditures *on migration*”. In both tables, we present industries ranked by the “sum” column, i.e. the

column that gives the total expenditure in each sector over the period. Since Table 6 provides information on the upper bound of lobbying expenditures on migration, while Table 8 gives information on (approximately) lobbying expenditures on migration, we will focus our discussion on Table 8.

Several interesting results emerge in Table 8. First, Table 8 shows clearly who the top spenders are – among industries – in terms of lobbying on immigration between 1998 and 2005. Computers/Internet is the very top spender on lobbying for immigration in the period considered. The Computers/Internet industry spent approximately a total of US\$16.8 mn in the years 1998-2005. Over the same period, on average a firm in this industry spent US\$136,000 for lobbying on immigration in a given year.³² Firms in the Computers/Internet industry spent as little as US\$2,500 and as much as US\$695,000 for lobbying on immigration, in a given year.

Among the top spenders, we also find Education, Air Transport, Hospitals/Nursing Homes, Miscellaneous Manufacturing & Distributing, and Agricultural Services/Products. The patterns in this table are consistent with anecdotal evidence. Except for the Air Transport industry, these are all sectors which use large numbers of immigrants. For example, many university professors and researchers are foreign-born. There is great demand for foreign nurses in the United States given the low supply of native-born nurses. Finally, the agricultural sector is completely dependent on the work of immigrant (unskilled) labor.

Note that, according to Table 8, the sector with the highest number of “firms” lobbying on migration over the period is Education: in 1998-2005, universities/educational institutions carried out lobbying activity on migration 296 times (some of these observations correspond to the same university in different years). For example, Harvard University, Georgetown University, New York University, etc. are all in the dataset, often for multiple years. However, on average, between 1998 and 2005, a university/educational institution did not spend much on migration lobbying in a given year (approximately US\$23,000).

³² Note that each of the 123 observations for the Computers/Internet industry in Table 8 corresponds to a given firm in a given year (thus, if a firm files in two different years, it counts twice).

Finally, note that the observation corresponding to the largest amount spent on lobbying for immigration in a given year is in the Hospitals/Nursing Homes industry (see the max column in Table 8 – the amount is US\$2,236,667, which was spent by the American Hospital Association in 2005³³).

Table 7 shows the number of issues which firms – spending money on immigration – did lobbying on, industry by industry, in the 1998-2005 period. For example, the 123 firms in the Computers/Internet industry that did lobbying on migration over the period 1998-2005 listed on average 9 policy issues in a given year. The 28 firms in the Agricultural Services & Products industry that did lobbying on migration over the same period listed on average 16 policy issues in a given year, instead.

Table 9 (like Table 5) focuses on a more restricted sample, i.e. “firms” spending lobbying money *only* on immigration. In other words, these are the firms which write down only migration as a policy issue in their lobbying report. Table 9 presents the amounts of lobbying expenditures on migration for these firms, industry by industry, in the 1998-2005 period. One of the industries with firms carrying out lobbying activity exclusively on migration is Human Rights. This selected group of firms in the Human Rights industry spent a total of US\$1.8 mn on lobbying for migration. Since migration is the only policy issue in the reports of these firms, we know for sure that all this money was targeted at shaping migration policy.

Finally, in Tables 10 and 11, we focus more directly on data at the firm level. In Table 10, we collapse the data on “total lobbying expenditures” and “lobbying expenditures on migration” across years at the firm level. In other words, we sum the values of the two variables, respectively, from all the (annual) lobbying reports corresponding to a given firm across all the eight years between 1998 and 2005. Table 10 shows the top 50 “firms” in terms of lobbying expenditures on migration, in 1998-2005.

Note that the main difference between Table 8 and Table 10 is that Table 8 provides information at the year/firm level on average for each industry while Table 10 gives information at the firm level summed over the eight years. So, for example, the US\$695,617 value for the max in the Computers/Internet industry in Table 8 gives the largest amount spent by a firm – for lobbying expenditure on immigration – in this sector

³³ The American Hospital Association filed only one report (this report) in the 1998-2005 period.

in one of the years between 1998-2005. On the other hand, the US\$3,564,231 value for “lobbying expenditures on migration” for Microsoft Corporation in Table 10 gives the sum of all expenditures by Microsoft *in all the eight years*.

The firm in the dataset which invested the largest amount on lobbying on migration over the eight years is Microsoft Corporation which, as mentioned above, spent approximately US\$3,6 mn to affect migration policy in this period. Among the top 50 “firms”, we also find the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Council of Agricultural Employers, the American Hospital Association, Disney Worldwide Services and, finally, also labor unions (United Auto Workers and the AFL-CIO).

Finally, Table 11 is more specific since it uses data from (annual) lobbying reports where only migration appears as a policy issue.

5. Conclusions

In this paper, we have used a firm-level dataset of lobbying expenditures, covering the period between 1998 and 2005, and have analyzed lobbying activity specifically targeted at shaping immigration policy. The dataset uses information from lobbying reports which firms involved in lobbying have to file since 1996, after the passage of the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act.

The dataset makes it possible to uncover a number of interesting patterns in lobbying activity on migration policy in the United States, both across years, sectors and firms. In general, it provides a wealth of information on the activity of interest groups in the sphere of immigration policy. Thus, it is likely to greatly contribute to political economy analyses of US migration policy.

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Appendix: Details about lobbying expenditures data

In addition to campaign contributions to political candidates for election purposes, each year companies, labor unions, and other organizations spend billions of dollars to hire lobbying firms which lobby incumbent members of Congress and of federal agencies on their behalf. Some special interests hire external lobbying firms; others have lobbyists working in-house.

The data on lobbying expenditures are compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) using the semi-annual lobbying disclosure reports filed with the Secretary of the Senate's Office of Public Records (SOPR) and posted to its website. The reports analyzed by CRP cover lobbying activity that took place from 1998 through 2005.

The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 requires lobbying firms and organizations to register and to file reports of their lobbying activities with the SOPR. In general, it requires registration by any individual lobbyist (or the individual's employer if it employs one or more lobbyists) within 45 days after the individual first makes – or is employed or retained to make – a lobbying contact with either the President, the Vice President, a Member of Congress, or any other specified Federal officer or employee, including certain high-ranking members of the uniformed services.

A registrant must file a report for the semiannual period when registration initially occurs and for each semiannual period thereafter, including the period during which registration terminates. Lobbying firms (i.e., entities with one or more lobbyists, including self-employed individuals who act as lobbyists for outside clients) are required to file a separate report for each client covered by a registration. Organizations employing in-house lobbyists file a single report for each semiannual period. The semiannual report must be filed no later than 45 days after the end of a semiannual period beginning on the first day of January and the first day of July of every year in which a registrant is registered. The LDA requires the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives to make all registrations and reports available to the public as soon as practicable after they are received.

Under the Section 3(10) of the LDA, an individual is defined as a “lobbyist” with respect to a particular client if he or she makes more than one lobbying contact on behalf

of that client (i.e. more than one communication to a covered official) and his or her “lobbying activities” constitute at least 20 percent of the individual's time in services for that client over any six-months period. “Lobbying activity” is defined in Section 3(7) of the LDA as “lobbying contacts or efforts in support of such contacts, including background work that is intended, at the time it was performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of others.”

Section 15 of the LDA permits those organizations that file under Sections 6033(b)(8) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and organizations that are subject to Section 162(e) of the IRC to use the tax law definitions of lobbying in lieu of the LDA definitions for determining “contacts” and “lobbying activities”. The definition of lobbying in the tax law is broader with respect to the type of activities reported, while it is narrower with respect to the executive branch officials who are contacted. For example, the definition of lobbying under the tax code includes “grass-roots”, state and local lobbying, while the LDA excludes these types of lobbying from the definition of “lobbying activities.” Under the amendment of the LDA in 1998, registrants who use tax law definitions of lobbying must use the IRC definition for executive branch lobbying and the LDA definition for legislative branch lobbying.

There are three different filing methods listed in the form. Two options are largely identical (one for for-profit groups, the other for non-profit groups) and use the definition of lobbying provided by the IRC. The third follows the definition of lobbying contained in the LDA. As discussed above, filers using the IRC methods must report state, local and grassroots lobbying costs, which are not included in the reports which follow the LDA definition. Thus, lobbying expenditures may not be strictly comparable across organizations using different filing methods.


**Table 1. Targeted Political Activity
(in millions of US dollars)**

| Election cycle | 1999-2000 | 2001-02 | 2003-04 |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Contributions from PACs | 326 | 348 | 461 |
| Overall lobbying exp | 2,949 | 3,330 | 4,048 |
| <i>Of which exp for immigration</i> | 32 | 24 | 33 |
| Total targeted political activity | 3,275 | 3,678 | 4,509 |


Source: Center for Responsive Politics. *Overall lobbying exp* are equal to the sum of lobbying expenditures of all firms on any issue. *Exp for immigration* are equal to lobbying expenditures on migration of firms/business associations/unions spending money on immigration.

Figure 1. Scatter Plots between Lobbying Expenditures and Campaign Contributions from PACs, 2001-2005

PACs campaign contributions and overall lobbying expenditures
(in millions of US\$)



PACs campaign contributions and immigration lobbying exp
(in millions of US\$)



The “overall lobbying expenditures” are equal to the sum of firm-level lobbying expenditures on any issue of all firms/business associations/unions in all industries, year by year. “Immigration lobbying expenditures” in the right panel correspond to “total lobbying expenditures” in Figure 3. See end of Figure 3.

Figure 2. Overall Lobbying Expenditures, year by year (1998-2005)




Figure 3. Total Lobbying Expenditures, year by year (1998-2005)





Figure 4. Lobbying expenditures on migration, year by year (1998-2005)



The “overall lobbying expenditures” are equal to the sum of firm-level lobbying expenditures on any issue of all firms/business associations/unions in all industries, year by year. The “total lobbying expenditures” are equal to the sum of firm-level lobbying expenditures on any issue of firms/business associations/unions spending money on immigration in all industries, year by year. The “lobbying expenditures on migration” are equal to the sum of firm-level lobbying expenditures on migration of firms/business associations/unions spending money on immigration in all industries, year by year.

Table 2. Total (i.e., on any issue) lobbying expenditures of firms/business associations/unions spending money on immigration, by year

| year | mean | N | sum | min | max | sd |
|--------------|-------------|----------|---------------|------------|------------|-----------|
| 1998 | 893,178 | 220 | 196,000,000 | 10,000 | 17,000,000 | 1,876,152 |
| 1999 | 736,333 | 159 | 117,000,000 | 11,250 | 8,300,000 | 1,294,313 |
| 2000 | 880,145 | 231 | 203,000,000 | 15,000 | 21,500,000 | 2,054,638 |
| 2001 | 641,461 | 179 | 115,000,000 | 15,000 | 7,003,395 | 1,267,866 |
| 2002 | 651,462 | 212 | 138,000,000 | 20,000 | 9,231,329 | 1,421,388 |
| 2003 | 683,794 | 174 | 119,000,000 | 20,000 | 8,740,000 | 1,375,422 |
| 2004 | 894,266 | 220 | 197,000,000 | 13,500 | 16,900,000 | 1,888,383 |
| 2005 | 850,357 | 267 | 227,000,000 | 20,000 | 13,400,000 | 1,738,925 |
| Total | 789,762 | 1662 | 1,310,000,000 | 10,000 | 21,500,000 | 1,673,093 |

Table 3. Number of policy issues on which firms/business associations/unions - spending money on immigration - do lobbying, by year

| year | mean | N | sum | min | max | sd |
|--------------|-------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|
| 1998 | 9.627273 | 220 | 2118 | 1 | 32 | 6.407557 |
| 1999 | 9.427673 | 159 | 1499 | 1 | 32 | 6.339008 |
| 2000 | 9.398268 | 231 | 2171 | 1 | 34 | 6.133075 |
| 2001 | 8.810056 | 179 | 1577 | 1 | 32 | 5.97821 |
| 2002 | 12.36321 | 212 | 2621 | 1 | 39 | 9.452057 |
| 2003 | 8.609195 | 174 | 1498 | 1 | 31 | 5.994904 |
| 2004 | 9.181818 | 220 | 2020 | 1 | 31 | 5.906705 |
| 2005 | 9.187266 | 267 | 2453 | 1 | 32 | 6.276414 |
| Total | 9.601083 | 1662 | 15957 | 1 | 39 | 6.743807 |

Table 4. Lobbying expenditures *on migration* of firms/business associations/unions spending money on immigration, by year

| year | mean | N | sum | min | max | sd |
|--------------|-------------|----------|-------------|------------|------------|-----------|
| 1998 | 82,432 | 220 | 18,100,000 | 1,667 | 622,857 | 109,517 |
| 1999 | 83,089 | 159 | 13,200,000 | 952 | 691,667 | 121,003 |
| 2000 | 82,616 | 231 | 19,100,000 | 1,250 | 1,342,500 | 144,621 |
| 2001 | 71,659 | 179 | 12,800,000 | 1,739 | 778,155 | 114,784 |
| 2002 | 52,266 | 212 | 11,100,000 | 690 | 471,490 | 69,299 |
| 2003 | 76,852 | 174 | 13,400,000 | 1,538 | 650,000 | 112,179 |
| 2004 | 87,179 | 220 | 19,200,000 | 1,500 | 734,783 | 121,108 |
| 2005 | 86,240 | 267 | 23,000,000 | 2,500 | 2,236,667 | 173,099 |
| Total | 78,168 | 1662 | 130,000,000 | 690 | 2,236,667 | 126,706 |

Table 5. Lobbying expenditures *on migration* of firms/business associations/unions spending money ONLY on immigration, by year

| year | mean | N | sum | min | max | sd |
|--------------|-------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|
| 1998 | 122,333 | 12 | 1,468,000 | 30,000 | 380,000 | 120,950 |
| 1999 | 125,375 | 12 | 1,504,500 | 14,000 | 470,000 | 128,109 |
| 2000 | 176,983 | 10 | 1,769,830 | 20,000 | 670,000 | 225,844 |
| 2001 | 124,476 | 10 | 1,244,761 | 20,000 | 270,000 | 81,363 |
| 2002 | 126,000 | 10 | 1,260,000 | 20,000 | 280,000 | 82,084 |
| 2003 | 104,333 | 12 | 1,252,000 | 20,000 | 200,000 | 64,215 |
| 2004 | 110,598 | 14 | 1,548,370 | 30,000 | 260,000 | 73,986 |
| 2005 | 93,520 | 18 | 1,683,355 | 20,000 | 250,000 | 77,483 |
| Total | 119,702 | 98 | 11,700,000 | 14,000 | 670,000 | 110,740 |

Table 6. Total (i.e., on any issue) lobbying expenditures of firms/business associations/unions spending money on immigration, by industry (CRP classification), in 1998-2005

| Industry (CRP classification) | mean | N | sum | min | max | sd | ranking sum |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|----------|-------------|------------|------------|-----------|--------------------|
| Computers/Internet | 1,503,544 | 123 | 185,000,000 | 20,000 | 9,460,000 | 2,125,885 | 1 |
| Automotive | 3,059,453 | 28 | 85,700,000 | 40,000 | 13,100,000 | 3,338,567 | 2 |
| Misc Manufacturing & Distributin | 2,056,955 | 39 | 80,200,000 | 20,000 | 16,900,000 | 3,324,897 | 3 |
| Agricultural Services & Products | 2,180,490 | 28 | 61,100,000 | 80,000 | 8,015,333 | 2,755,469 | 4 |
| Telephone Utilities | 6,611,470 | 9 | 59,500,000 | 4,200,000 | 8,848,499 | 1,194,022 | 5 |
| Business Associations | 3,879,333 | 15 | 58,200,000 | 60,000 | 21,500,000 | 6,847,803 | 6 |
| Education | 190,244 | 296 | 56,300,000 | 11,250 | 1,240,000 | 188,312 | 7 |
| Pharmaceuticals / Health Product | 1,896,738 | 28 | 53,100,000 | 20,000 | 6,800,000 | 2,083,313 | 8 |
| Oil & Gas | 1,908,955 | 27 | 51,500,000 | 20,000 | 8,550,000 | 2,545,354 | 9 |
| Telecom Services & Equipment | 2,833,410 | 16 | 45,300,000 | 40,000 | 7,588,155 | 2,501,535 | 10 |
| Air Transport | 1,158,382 | 35 | 40,500,000 | 60,000 | 3,800,000 | 953,115 | 11 |
| Business Services | 1,273,613 | 31 | 39,500,000 | 20,000 | 4,360,000 | 1,581,583 | 12 |
| Defense Aerospace | 2,234,696 | 14 | 31,300,000 | 220,000 | 9,740,000 | 2,968,292 | 13 |
| Hospitals & Nursing Homes | 533,982 | 55 | 29,400,000 | 20,000 | 13,400,000 | 1,785,118 | 14 |
| Misc Unions | 614,175 | 42 | 25,800,000 | 20,000 | 2,800,000 | 853,125 | 15 |
| Electronics Mfg & Services | 560,446 | 44 | 24,700,000 | 10,000 | 4,000,000 | 919,233 | 16 |
| Industrial Unions | 1,065,288 | 22 | 23,400,000 | 100,000 | 2,494,317 | 798,598 | 17 |
| Human Rights | 237,941 | 92 | 21,900,000 | 20,000 | 3,502,460 | 425,344 | 18 |
| Misc Issues | 329,859 | 65 | 21,400,000 | 13,500 | 1,310,000 | 337,726 | 19 |
| Republican/Conservative | 1,188,388 | 18 | 21,400,000 | 115,000 | 6,380,000 | 1,437,967 | 19 |
| Civil Servants/Public Officials | 217,090 | 74 | 16,100,000 | 20,000 | 1,220,000 | 270,973 | 21 |
| Food & Beverage | 580,574 | 27 | 15,700,000 | 40,000 | 1,052,420 | 336,686 | 22 |
| Public Sector Unions | 1,305,572 | 12 | 15,700,000 | 40,000 | 2,743,000 | 776,295 | 22 |
| Recreation / Live Entertainment | 400,652 | 35 | 14,000,000 | 20,000 | 1,607,228 | 481,120 | 24 |
| Accountants | 1,487,111 | 9 | 13,400,000 | 580,000 | 3,160,000 | 964,331 | 25 |
| Health Professionals | 504,724 | 26 | 13,100,000 | 30,000 | 1,802,995 | 509,626 | 26 |
| Securities & Investment | 840,653 | 14 | 11,800,000 | 20,000 | 2,560,000 | 833,948 | 27 |
| Transportation Unions | 704,750 | 16 | 11,300,000 | 160,000 | 2,900,000 | 710,452 | 28 |
| Tobacco | 11,200,000 | 1 | 11,200,000 | 11,200,000 | 11,200,000 | . | 29 |
| Lawyers / Law Firms | 451,698 | 24 | 10,800,000 | 15,000 | 1,300,000 | 557,472 | 30 |
| TV / Movies / Music | 814,715 | 13 | 10,600,000 | 32,500 | 4,020,000 | 1,305,107 | 31 |
| Commercial Banks | 2,710,000 | 3 | 8,130,000 | 840,000 | 5,700,000 | 2,616,429 | 32 |
| Food Processing & Sales | 289,719 | 28 | 8,112,117 | 20,000 | 980,000 | 322,043 | 33 |
| Real Estate | 1,594,000 | 5 | 7,970,000 | 60,000 | 7,590,000 | 3,351,996 | 34 |
| Finance / Credit Companies | 1,954,750 | 4 | 7,819,000 | 880,000 | 3,550,000 | 1,224,128 | 35 |
| Lodging / Tourism | 334,565 | 23 | 7,695,000 | 20,000 | 1,640,000 | 362,194 | 36 |
| Forestry & Forest Products | 1,097,865 | 7 | 7,685,058 | 20,000 | 4,300,000 | 1,591,137 | 37 |
| Beer, Wine & Liquor | 824,192 | 9 | 7,417,729 | 100,000 | 2,932,213 | 902,068 | 38 |
| Defense Electronics | 911,063 | 8 | 7,288,500 | 50,000 | 1,360,000 | 414,885 | 39 |
| Sea Transport | 901,833 | 8 | 7,214,663 | 559,601 | 1,280,654 | 228,363 | 40 |
| Insurance | 2,193,333 | 3 | 6,580,000 | 1,120,000 | 3,820,000 | 1,432,527 | 41 |
| Non-profits, Foundations & Phila | 218,667 | 30 | 6,560,000 | 40,000 | 1,840,000 | 368,124 | 42 |
| Crop Production & Basic Processi | 286,767 | 20 | 5,735,332 | 20,000 | 1,014,289 | 342,414 | 43 |
| Chemical & Related Manufacturing | 423,868 | 12 | 5,086,420 | 80,000 | 760,000 | 230,857 | 44 |
| Building Materials & Equipment | 702,763 | 7 | 4,919,342 | 160,000 | 2,020,000 | 682,551 | 45 |
| Other-Other | 314,092 | 15 | 4,711,383 | 20,000 | 1,100,000 | 362,455 | 46 |
| Dairy | 337,154 | 13 | 4,383,000 | 48,000 | 620,000 | 211,169 | 47 |

Table 6. Total (i.e., on any issue) lobbying expenditures of firms/business associations/unions spending money on immigration, by industry (CRP classification), in 1998-2005 (cont.)

| Industry (CRP classification) | mean | N | sum | min | max | sd | ranking sum |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|-------------|----------------------|---------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Casinos / Gambling | 528,750 | 8 | 4,230,000 | 20,000 | 2,200,000 | 767,583 | 48 |
| Retail Sales | 574,286 | 7 | 4,020,000 | 40,000 | 1,620,000 | 605,939 | 49 |
| Health Services/HMOs | 312,604 | 12 | 3,751,250 | 40,000 | 520,000 | 178,856 | 50 |
| Misc Agriculture | 263,615 | 13 | 3,427,000 | 85,000 | 500,000 | 126,984 | 51 |
| Foreign & Defense Policy | 125,867 | 27 | 3,398,399 | 14,000 | 380,000 | 68,139 | 52 |
| General Contractors | 770,000 | 4 | 3,080,000 | 80,000 | 2,000,000 | 888,069 | 53 |
| Poultry & Eggs | 333,750 | 8 | 2,670,000 | 40,000 | 1,000,000 | 415,793 | 54 |
| Building Trade Unions | 186,429 | 14 | 2,610,000 | 20,000 | 520,000 | 130,420 | 55 |
| Special Trade Contractors | 186,250 | 12 | 2,235,000 | 35,000 | 540,000 | 143,069 | 56 |
| Misc Business | 370,808 | 6 | 2,224,848 | 15,000 | 700,000 | 267,306 | 57 |
| Misc Finance | 226,434 | 8 | 1,811,474 | 40,000 | 520,000 | 184,099 | 58 |
| Livestock | 240,000 | 6 | 1,440,000 | 40,000 | 1,080,000 | 411,825 | 59 |
| Home Builders | 680,000 | 2 | 1,360,000 | 600,000 | 760,000 | 113,137 | 60 |
| Pro-Israel | 147,429 | 9 | 1,326,860 | 40,000 | 228,607 | 61,996 | 61 |
| Mining | 133,778 | 9 | 1,204,000 | 100,000 | 160,000 | 27,431 | 62 |
| Democratic/Liberal | 270,728 | 4 | 1,082,910 | 239,564 | 323,346 | 39,875 | 63 |
| Electric Utilities | 488,698 | 2 | 977,395 | 120,000 | 857,395 | 521,417 | 64 |
| Steel Production | 400,000 | 2 | 800,000 | 160,000 | 640,000 | 339,411 | 65 |
| Clergy & Religious Organizations | 360,000 | 2 | 720,000 | 120,000 | 600,000 | 339,411 | 66 |
| Miscellaneous Defense | 100,667 | 6 | 604,000 | 60,000 | 154,000 | 39,531 | 67 |
| Environment | 169,295 | 3 | 507,884 | 40,000 | 427,884 | 223,945 | 68 |
| Misc Energy | 125,000 | 4 | 500,000 | 20,000 | 220,000 | 85,440 | 69 |
| Miscellaneous Services | 206,250 | 2 | 412,500 | 200,000 | 212,500 | 8,839 | 70 |
| Trucking | 200,000 | 2 | 400,000 | 40,000 | 360,000 | 226,274 | 71 |
| Women's Issues | 155,000 | 2 | 310,000 | 150,000 | 160,000 | 7,071 | 72 |
| Construction Services | 150,000 | 2 | 300,000 | 60,000 | 240,000 | 127,279 | 73 |
| Misc Health | 70,000 | 4 | 280,000 | 40,000 | 100,000 | 25,820 | 74 |
| Savings & Loans | 100,000 | 2 | 200,000 | 40,000 | 160,000 | 84,853 | 75 |
| Railroads | 90,000 | 2 | 180,000 | 60,000 | 120,000 | 42,426 | 76 |
| Textiles | 160,000 | 1 | 160,000 | 160,000 | 160,000 | . | 77 |
| Fisheries & Wildlife | 120,000 | 1 | 120,000 | 120,000 | 120,000 | . | 78 |
| Environmental Svcs/Equipment | 80,000 | 1 | 80,000 | 80,000 | 80,000 | . | 79 |
| Lobbyists | 40,000 | 2 | 80,000 | 20,000 | 60,000 | 28,284 | 79 |
| Total | 789,762 | 1662 | 1,310,000,000 | 10,000 | 21,500,000 | 1,673,093 | |

Table 7. Number of issues on which firms/business associations/unions - spending money on immigration - do lobbying, by industry (CRP classification), in 1998-2005

| Industry (CRP classification) | mean | N | sum | min | max | sd |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|
| Accountants | 7.67 | 9 | 69 | 6 | 11 | 1.80 |
| Agricultural Services & Products | 16.07 | 28 | 450 | 4 | 27 | 6.90 |
| Air Transport | 7.94 | 35 | 278 | 2 | 27 | 5.01 |
| Automotive | 13.93 | 28 | 390 | 2 | 32 | 8.20 |
| Beer, Wine & Liquor | 11.33 | 9 | 102 | 4 | 18 | 5.41 |
| Building Materials & Equipment | 7.43 | 7 | 52 | 4 | 12 | 2.76 |
| Building Trade Unions | 11.57 | 14 | 162 | 7 | 16 | 2.90 |
| Business Associations | 10.93 | 15 | 164 | 3 | 32 | 7.04 |
| Business Services | 8.84 | 31 | 274 | 1 | 27 | 7.07 |
| Casinos / Gambling | 15.13 | 8 | 121 | 4 | 30 | 11.76 |
| Chemical & Related Manufacturing | 10.58 | 12 | 127 | 2 | 27 | 7.09 |
| Civil Servants/Public Officials | 11.14 | 74 | 824 | 1 | 30 | 8.37 |
| Clergy & Religious Organizations | 11.00 | 2 | 22 | 9 | 13 | 2.83 |
| Commercial Banks | 14.67 | 3 | 44 | 9 | 22 | 6.66 |
| Computers/Internet | 9.29 | 123 | 1143 | 2 | 21 | 4.65 |
| Construction Services | 8.50 | 2 | 17 | 4 | 13 | 6.36 |
| Crop Production & Basic Processi | 6.30 | 20 | 126 | 2 | 12 | 3.40 |
| Dairy | 6.62 | 13 | 86 | 4 | 8 | 1.19 |
| Defense Aerospace | 16.21 | 14 | 227 | 10 | 34 | 5.86 |
| Defense Electronics | 14.38 | 8 | 115 | 4 | 22 | 5.26 |
| Democratic/Liberal | 12.00 | 4 | 48 | 10 | 15 | 2.16 |
| Education | 10.40 | 296 | 3079 | 1 | 33 | 6.56 |
| Electric Utilities | 3.50 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 0.71 |
| Electronics Mfg & Services | 7.52 | 44 | 331 | 2 | 18 | 4.16 |
| Environment | 12.33 | 3 | 37 | 11 | 13 | 1.15 |
| Environmental Svcs/Equipment | 6.00 | 1 | 6 | 6 | 6 | . |
| Finance / Credit Companies | 10.00 | 4 | 40 | 7 | 12 | 2.16 |
| Fisheries & Wildlife | 4.00 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 4 | . |
| Food & Beverage | 9.67 | 27 | 261 | 1 | 16 | 4.10 |
| Food Processing & Sales | 8.50 | 28 | 238 | 1 | 27 | 5.32 |
| Foreign & Defense Policy | 4.56 | 27 | 123 | 1 | 13 | 3.76 |
| Forestry & Forest Products | 10.57 | 7 | 74 | 2 | 19 | 5.32 |
| General Contractors | 11.50 | 4 | 46 | 8 | 14 | 2.52 |
| Health Professionals | 8.88 | 26 | 231 | 1 | 27 | 7.51 |
| Health Services/HMOs | 8.33 | 12 | 100 | 2 | 22 | 5.77 |
| Home Builders | 14.00 | 2 | 28 | 6 | 22 | 11.31 |
| Hospitals & Nursing Homes | 6.05 | 55 | 333 | 1 | 33 | 5.30 |
| Human Rights | 8.38 | 92 | 771 | 1 | 28 | 6.03 |
| Industrial Unions | 14.73 | 22 | 324 | 6 | 23 | 5.28 |
| Insurance | 14.00 | 3 | 42 | 13 | 15 | 1.00 |
| Lawyers / Law Firms | 8.38 | 24 | 201 | 1 | 24 | 10.42 |
| Livestock | 5.83 | 6 | 35 | 4 | 7 | 0.98 |
| Lobbyists | 15.00 | 2 | 30 | 4 | 26 | 15.56 |
| Lodging / Tourism | 5.57 | 23 | 128 | 2 | 16 | 3.20 |
| Mining | 4.89 | 9 | 44 | 2 | 12 | 2.89 |
| Misc Agriculture | 2.23 | 13 | 29 | 1 | 7 | 1.64 |
| Misc Business | 5.17 | 6 | 31 | 2 | 12 | 3.60 |

Table 7. Number of issues on which firms/business associations/unions - spending money on immigration - do lobbying, by industry (CRP classification), in 1998-2005 (cont.)

| Industry (CRP classification) | mean | N | sum | min | max | sd |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| Misc Energy | 17.25 | 4 | 69 | 5 | 30 | 12.58 |
| Misc Finance | 11.88 | 8 | 95 | 3 | 32 | 11.14 |
| Misc Health | 3.00 | 4 | 12 | 2 | 4 | 0.82 |
| Misc Issues | 4.34 | 65 | 282 | 1 | 23 | 4.61 |
| Misc Manufacturing & Distributin | 10.95 | 39 | 427 | 3 | 25 | 6.35 |
| Misc Unions | 12.55 | 42 | 527 | 1 | 30 | 8.47 |
| Miscellaneous Defense | 4.67 | 6 | 28 | 2 | 10 | 2.80 |
| Miscellaneous Services | 5.50 | 2 | 11 | 1 | 10 | 6.36 |
| Non-profits, Foundations & Phila | 7.97 | 30 | 239 | 2 | 24 | 5.72 |
| Oil & Gas | 12.52 | 27 | 338 | 4 | 23 | 5.73 |
| Other-Other | 4.80 | 15 | 72 | 1 | 25 | 5.87 |
| Pharmaceuticals / Health Product | 11.29 | 28 | 316 | 1 | 33 | 8.13 |
| Poultry & Eggs | 9.00 | 8 | 72 | 7 | 11 | 1.41 |
| Pro-Israel | 8.56 | 9 | 77 | 1 | 12 | 3.05 |
| Public Sector Unions | 17.50 | 12 | 210 | 11 | 27 | 4.21 |
| Railroads | 7.00 | 2 | 14 | 7 | 7 | 0.00 |
| Real Estate | 15.60 | 5 | 78 | 2 | 37 | 15.14 |
| Recreation / Live Entertainment | 7.74 | 35 | 271 | 1 | 22 | 5.22 |
| Republican/Conservative | 13.33 | 18 | 240 | 6 | 25 | 5.36 |
| Retail Sales | 11.00 | 7 | 77 | 2 | 30 | 10.05 |
| Savings & Loans | 5.00 | 2 | 10 | 1 | 9 | 5.66 |
| Sea Transport | 6.63 | 8 | 53 | 6 | 8 | 0.74 |
| Securities & Investment | 8.50 | 14 | 119 | 1 | 19 | 5.92 |
| Special Trade Contractors | 7.08 | 12 | 85 | 4 | 10 | 1.78 |
| Steel Production | 5.50 | 2 | 11 | 4 | 7 | 2.12 |
| TV / Movies / Music | 8.92 | 13 | 116 | 2 | 30 | 8.00 |
| Telecom Services & Equipment | 12.13 | 16 | 194 | 4 | 20 | 4.66 |
| Telephone Utilities | 16.67 | 9 | 150 | 8 | 39 | 9.55 |
| Textiles | 6.00 | 1 | 6 | 6 | 6 | . |
| Tobacco | 23.00 | 1 | 23 | 23 | 23 | . |
| Transportation Unions | 17.06 | 16 | 273 | 6 | 30 | 7.94 |
| Trucking | 19.50 | 2 | 39 | 13 | 26 | 9.19 |
| Women's Issues | 4.50 | 2 | 9 | 4 | 5 | 0.71 |
| Total | 9.60 | 1662 | 15957 | 1 | 39 | 6.74 |

Table 8. Lobbying expenditures *on migration* of firms/business associations/unions spending money on immigration, by industry (CRP classification), in 1998-2005

| Industry (CRP classification) | mean | N | sum | min | max | sd | ranking | sum |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|----------------|------------|
| Computers/Internet | 136,511 | 123 | 16,800,000 | 2,500 | 695,617 | 152,387 | | 1 |
| Misc Issues | 135,655 | 65 | 8,817,561 | 1,500 | 670,000 | 167,972 | | 2 |
| Education | 23,449 | 296 | 6,940,910 | 1,125 | 133,333 | 23,735 | | 3 |
| Air Transport | 160,333 | 35 | 5,611,670 | 2,222 | 422,222 | 116,378 | | 4 |
| Hospitals & Nursing Homes | 93,761 | 55 | 5,156,856 | 3,030 | 2,236,667 | 296,678 | | 5 |
| Misc Manufacturing & Distributin | 130,663 | 39 | 5,095,843 | 2,500 | 734,783 | 144,527 | | 6 |
| Automotive | 170,844 | 28 | 4,783,620 | 4,444 | 622,857 | 149,586 | | 7 |
| Pharmaceuticals / Health Product | 154,597 | 28 | 4,328,723 | 10,000 | 585,556 | 174,016 | | 8 |
| Telephone Utilities | 477,450 | 9 | 4,297,054 | 165,641 | 778,155 | 184,802 | | 9 |
| Human Rights | 46,574 | 92 | 4,284,772 | 1,429 | 350,246 | 70,858 | | 10 |
| Business Associations | 266,488 | 15 | 3,997,322 | 5,455 | 1,342,500 | 389,910 | | 11 |
| Business Services | 119,143 | 31 | 3,693,440 | 5,926 | 448,571 | 119,150 | | 12 |
| Telecom Services & Equipment | 227,018 | 16 | 3,632,281 | 6,667 | 720,763 | 207,765 | | 13 |
| Oil & Gas | 132,035 | 27 | 3,564,937 | 4,000 | 855,000 | 193,130 | | 14 |
| Agricultural Services & Products | 117,524 | 28 | 3,290,668 | 4,706 | 471,490 | 142,700 | | 15 |
| Electronics Mfg & Services | 56,069 | 44 | 2,467,027 | 1,667 | 363,636 | 75,753 | | 16 |
| Health Professionals | 88,351 | 26 | 2,297,130 | 10,000 | 450,000 | 101,261 | | 17 |
| Recreation / Live Entertainment | 55,684 | 35 | 1,948,928 | 2,222 | 213,333 | 63,010 | | 18 |
| Civil Servants/Public Officials | 25,811 | 74 | 1,910,011 | 690 | 120,000 | 24,045 | | 19 |
| Misc Agriculture | 146,390 | 13 | 1,903,071 | 42,500 | 250,000 | 69,946 | | 20 |
| Accountants | 202,036 | 9 | 1,818,323 | 82,857 | 526,667 | 150,523 | | 21 |
| Defense Aerospace | 115,031 | 14 | 1,610,429 | 18,750 | 431,765 | 128,225 | | 22 |
| Food & Beverage | 58,898 | 27 | 1,590,238 | 20,000 | 116,936 | 28,602 | | 23 |
| Lodging / Tourism | 68,771 | 23 | 1,581,738 | 2,500 | 410,000 | 82,874 | | 24 |
| Foreign & Defense Policy | 57,051 | 27 | 1,540,387 | 8,000 | 380,000 | 78,085 | | 25 |
| Industrial Unions | 68,433 | 22 | 1,505,519 | 13,913 | 144,444 | 41,035 | | 26 |
| Lawyers / Law Firms | 61,535 | 24 | 1,476,848 | 7,500 | 180,000 | 37,406 | | 27 |
| Misc Unions | 34,949 | 42 | 1,467,840 | 4,444 | 116,191 | 30,698 | | 28 |
| Republican/Conservative | 80,404 | 18 | 1,447,275 | 11,500 | 277,391 | 63,641 | | 29 |
| Other-Other | 92,101 | 15 | 1,381,522 | 8,000 | 366,667 | 114,224 | | 30 |
| Food Processing & Sales | 45,527 | 28 | 1,274,768 | 1,818 | 275,000 | 56,618 | | 31 |
| Securities & Investment | 82,844 | 14 | 1,159,817 | 20,000 | 152,500 | 48,421 | | 32 |
| Sea Transport | 137,926 | 8 | 1,103,407 | 79,943 | 182,951 | 37,673 | | 33 |
| Non-profits, Foundations & Phila | 36,201 | 30 | 1,086,036 | 4,583 | 368,000 | 66,753 | | 34 |
| Public Sector Unions | 73,265 | 12 | 879,185 | 3,636 | 152,389 | 43,385 | | 35 |
| Building Materials & Equipment | 114,839 | 7 | 803,870 | 17,778 | 336,667 | 124,815 | | 36 |
| TV / Movies / Music | 61,529 | 13 | 799,876 | 8,000 | 268,000 | 73,157 | | 37 |
| Finance / Credit Companies | 189,953 | 4 | 759,811 | 88,000 | 322,727 | 98,186 | | 38 |
| Dairy | 51,375 | 13 | 667,869 | 6,000 | 88,571 | 29,892 | | 39 |
| Forestry & Forest Products | 91,482 | 7 | 640,377 | 6,316 | 286,667 | 113,675 | | 40 |
| Misc Business | 106,315 | 6 | 637,891 | 1,250 | 233,333 | 82,609 | | 41 |
| Health Services/HMOs | 52,987 | 12 | 635,841 | 1,818 | 90,000 | 31,648 | | 42 |
| Crop Production & Basic Processi | 31,696 | 20 | 633,918 | 4,000 | 92,208 | 29,356 | | 43 |
| Transportation Unions | 36,871 | 16 | 589,932 | 14,545 | 116,000 | 25,141 | | 44 |
| Chemical & Related Manufacturing | 47,622 | 12 | 571,459 | 8,889 | 84,444 | 24,478 | | 45 |
| Retail Sales | 79,548 | 7 | 556,833 | 1,333 | 240,000 | 81,089 | | 46 |
| Beer, Wine & Liquor | 61,299 | 9 | 551,695 | 15,000 | 162,901 | 48,207 | | 47 |

Table 8. Lobbying expenditures on migration of firms/business associations/unions spending money on immigration, by industry (CRP classification), in 1998-2005 (cont.)

| Industry (CRP classification) | mean | N | sum | min | max | sd | ranking | sum |
|---|-------------|----------|-------------|------------|------------|-----------|----------------|------------|
| Defense Electronics | 62,699 | 8 | 501,596 | 12,500 | 110,000 | 32,375 | | 48 |
| Commercial Banks | 166,791 | 3 | 500,373 | 64,615 | 259,091 | 97,613 | | 49 |
| Tobacco | 486,957 | 1 | 486,957 | 486,957 | 486,957 | . | | 50 |
| Insurance | 156,115 | 3 | 468,344 | 86,154 | 272,857 | 101,764 | | 51 |
| Casinos / Gambling | 47,948 | 8 | 383,587 | 1,667 | 193,333 | 64,579 | | 52 |
| Poultry & Eggs | 40,953 | 8 | 327,623 | 5,000 | 125,000 | 52,753 | | 53 |
| Special Trade Contractors | 25,539 | 12 | 306,472 | 7,000 | 77,143 | 19,053 | | 54 |
| Real Estate | 58,023 | 5 | 290,117 | 3,077 | 205,135 | 84,223 | | 55 |
| Mining | 32,185 | 9 | 289,667 | 11,667 | 50,000 | 10,767 | | 56 |
| Misc Finance | 32,582 | 8 | 260,654 | 4,615 | 104,000 | 37,093 | | 57 |
| Electric Utilities | 127,174 | 2 | 254,349 | 40,000 | 214,349 | 123,283 | | 58 |
| General Contractors | 62,500 | 4 | 250,000 | 10,000 | 166,667 | 73,099 | | 59 |
| Miscellaneous Services | 116,250 | 2 | 232,500 | 20,000 | 212,500 | 136,118 | | 60 |
| Building Trade Unions | 16,431 | 14 | 230,039 | 2,500 | 38,571 | 11,391 | | 61 |
| Livestock | 36,270 | 6 | 217,619 | 10,000 | 154,286 | 57,831 | | 62 |
| Pro-Israel | 19,527 | 9 | 175,742 | 11,111 | 40,000 | 9,045 | | 63 |
| Miscellaneous Defense | 28,494 | 6 | 170,967 | 6,000 | 60,000 | 18,468 | | 64 |
| Home Builders | 76,970 | 2 | 153,939 | 27,273 | 126,667 | 70,282 | | 65 |
| Steel Production | 65,714 | 2 | 131,429 | 40,000 | 91,429 | 36,365 | | 66 |
| Misc Health | 26,250 | 4 | 105,000 | 13,333 | 50,000 | 16,908 | | 67 |
| Democratic/Liberal | 22,744 | 4 | 90,975 | 19,964 | 25,455 | 2,454 | | 68 |
| Clergy & Religious Organizations | 37,949 | 2 | 75,897 | 9,231 | 66,667 | 40,613 | | 69 |
| Women's Issues | 35,000 | 2 | 70,000 | 30,000 | 40,000 | 7,071 | | 70 |
| Construction Services | 32,308 | 2 | 64,615 | 4,615 | 60,000 | 39,163 | | 71 |
| Savings & Loans | 28,889 | 2 | 57,778 | 17,778 | 40,000 | 15,713 | | 72 |
| Misc Energy | 13,401 | 4 | 53,603 | 769 | 27,500 | 12,476 | | 73 |
| Environment | 13,209 | 3 | 39,627 | 3,077 | 32,914 | 17,067 | | 74 |
| Fisheries & Wildlife | 30,000 | 1 | 30,000 | 30,000 | 30,000 | . | | 75 |
| Trucking | 14,615 | 2 | 29,231 | 1,538 | 27,692 | 18,494 | | 76 |
| Textiles | 26,667 | 1 | 26,667 | 26,667 | 26,667 | . | | 77 |
| Railroads | 12,857 | 2 | 25,714 | 8,571 | 17,143 | 6,061 | | 78 |
| Lobbyists | 7,885 | 2 | 15,769 | 769 | 15,000 | 10,063 | | 79 |
| Environmental Svcs/Equipment | 13,333 | 1 | 13,333 | 13,333 | 13,333 | . | | 80 |
| Total | 78,168 | 1662 | 130,000,000 | 690 | 2,236,667 | 126,706 | | |

Table 9. Lobbying expenditures *on migration* for firms/business associations/unions spending money **ONLY on immigration, by industry (CRP classification), in 1998-2005**

| Industry (CRP classification) | mean | N | sum | min | max | sd | ranking | sum |
|---|-------------|----------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|----------------|------------|
| Misc Issues | 216,182 | 21 | 4,539,830 | 20,000 | 670,000 | 161,276 | | 1 |
| Human Rights | 161,818 | 11 | 1,780,000 | 20,000 | 270,000 | 86,697 | | 2 |
| Foreign & Defense Policy | 132,091 | 8 | 1,056,725 | 14,000 | 380,000 | 114,021 | | 3 |
| Lawyers / Law Firms | 73,269 | 14 | 1,025,761 | 20,000 | 180,000 | 43,320 | | 4 |
| Misc Agriculture | 178,000 | 4 | 712,000 | 160,000 | 200,000 | 16,813 | | 5 |
| Business Services | 79,714 | 7 | 558,000 | 20,000 | 120,000 | 43,057 | | 6 |
| Health Professionals | 114,500 | 4 | 458,000 | 48,000 | 200,000 | 77,380 | | 7 |
| Other-Other | 57,500 | 4 | 230,000 | 20,000 | 130,000 | 49,244 | | 8 |
| Miscellaneous Services | 212,500 | 1 | 212,500 | 212,500 | 212,500 | . | | 9 |
| Food Processing & Sales | 100,000 | 2 | 200,000 | 60,000 | 140,000 | 56,569 | | 10 |
| Education | 36,000 | 5 | 180,000 | 20,000 | 60,000 | 16,733 | | 11 |
| Civil Servants/Public Officials | 80,000 | 2 | 160,000 | 40,000 | 120,000 | 56,569 | | 12 |
| Hospitals & Nursing Homes | 52,667 | 3 | 158,000 | 30,000 | 68,000 | 20,033 | | 13 |
| Misc Unions | 40,000 | 3 | 120,000 | 20,000 | 80,000 | 34,641 | | 14 |
| Securities & Investment | 33,333 | 3 | 100,000 | 20,000 | 60,000 | 23,094 | | 15 |
| Pharmaceuticals / Health Product | 80,000 | 1 | 80,000 | 80,000 | 80,000 | . | | 16 |
| Food & Beverage | 40,000 | 1 | 40,000 | 40,000 | 40,000 | . | | 17 |
| Pro-Israel | 40,000 | 1 | 40,000 | 40,000 | 40,000 | . | | 17 |
| Recreation / Live Entertainment | 20,000 | 2 | 40,000 | 20,000 | 20,000 | 0 | | 17 |
| Savings & Loans | 40,000 | 1 | 40,000 | 40,000 | 40,000 | . | | 17 |
| Total | 119,702 | 98 | 11,700,000 | 14,000 | 670,000 | 110,740 | | |

Table 10. Top 50 firms/business associations/unions in terms of lobbying expenditures on migration , in 1998-2005

| firm | Total lobbying exp | Lobbying exp on migration | rank lobbying exp on migration |
|--|---------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Microsoft Corp | 48,220,000 | 3,564,231 | 1 |
| Motorola Inc | 33,293,458 | 2,660,473 | 2 |
| Business Roundtable | 37,460,000 | 2,514,167 | 3 |
| American Farm Bureau Federation | 49,589,013 | 2,505,281 | 4 |
| United to Secure America | 5,110,000 | 2,276,667 | 5 |
| American Hospital Assn | 13,420,000 | 2,236,667 | 6 |
| Intel Corp | 27,210,000 | 2,225,185 | 7 |
| Federation for Amer Immigration Reform | 2,200,000 | 2,200,000 | 8 |
| Verizon Communications | 33,110,000 | 2,197,689 | 9 |
| Texas Instruments | 17,122,728 | 2,004,260 | 10 |
| National Assn of Manufacturers | 40,080,585 | 1,966,480 | 11 |
| US Border Control | 3,741,110 | 1,850,650 | 12 |
| Disney Worldwide Services | 26,738,800 | 1,790,415 | 13 |
| American Council on Intl Personnel | 1,670,000 | 1,670,000 | 14 |
| American Electronics Assn | 18,804,902 | 1,599,212 | 15 |
| EDS Corp | 17,045,832 | 1,579,240 | 16 |
| IBM Corp | 29,852,000 | 1,528,373 | 17 |
| Delta Airlines | 14,280,000 | 1,364,444 | 18 |
| Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society | 1,255,225 | 1,255,225 | 19 |
| Eli Lilly & Co | 16,690,000 | 1,195,061 | 20 |
| Accenture | 11,899,000 | 1,176,559 | 21 |
| National Council of Agric Employers | 2,535,000 | 1,146,071 | 22 |
| International Council of Cruise Lines | 7,214,663 | 1,103,407 | 23 |
| Continental Airlines | 5,235,927 | 1,069,416 | 24 |
| DaimlerChrysler | 19,295,905 | 1,059,511 | 25 |
| SBC Communications | 13,344,729 | 1,053,865 | 26 |
| Shell Oil | 15,917,789 | 1,051,698 | 27 |
| Commonwealth of the N Mariana Islands | 3,800,000 | 1,020,533 | 28 |
| General Motors | 23,440,000 | 1,012,967 | 29 |
| Human Rights Campaign | 8,272,498 | 1,007,668 | 30 |
| Major League Baseball Commissioner's Ofc | 8,372,801 | 912,806 | 31 |
| Christian Coalition | 15,380,000 | 911,157 | 32 |
| Chevron Corp | 8,550,000 | 855,000 | 33 |
| United Airlines | 4,400,000 | 797,333 | 34 |
| United Auto Workers | 15,655,390 | 794,666 | 35 |
| Western Pacific Economic Council | 2,350,000 | 783,333 | 36 |
| Agricultural Cltn for Immigration Reform | 892,000 | 757,000 | 37 |
| Honda North America | 7,850,457 | 738,058 | 38 |
| Sun Microsystems | 6,540,000 | 737,950 | 39 |
| Oracle Corp | 7,500,590 | 735,801 | 40 |
| General Electric | 16,900,000 | 734,783 | 41 |
| Lockheed Martin | 17,080,000 | 718,235 | 42 |
| Natl Assn of Public Hosp & Health Sys | 3,520,000 | 710,619 | 43 |
| AFL-CIO | 18,230,000 | 694,634 | 44 |
| Biotechnology Industry Organization | 10,659,796 | 671,146 | 45 |
| English First | 4,550,000 | 653,143 | 46 |
| Abbott Laboratories | 6,717,000 | 627,700 | 47 |
| Ford Motor Co | 13,080,000 | 622,857 | 48 |
| Air Transport Assn of America | 3,107,922 | 621,584 | 49 |
| Principal Financial Group | 9,554,140 | 616,124 | 50 |

Table 11. Lobbying expenditures *on migration* from lobbying reports of firms/business associations/unions where ONLY migration appears as a policy issue, in 1998-2005

| firm | Lobbying exp on migration | rank lobbying exp on migration |
|--|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Federation for Amer Immigration Reform | 2,200,000 | 1 |
| American Council on Intl Personnel | 1,670,000 | 2 |
| US Border Control | 1,259,830 | 3 |
| Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society | 1,255,225 | 4 |
| Agricultural Cltn for Immigration Reform | 712,000 | 5 |
| Fragomen Del Rey et al | 565,000 | 6 |
| O'Grady Peyton International | 556,000 | 7 |
| NumbersUSA.com | 480,000 | 8 |
| American Immigration Lawyers Assn | 430,761 | 9 |
| Southwestern/Great American Inc | 340,000 | 10 |
| AIS Inc | 210,000 | 11 |
| Coalition for Comprehensive Imm Reform | 210,000 | 11 |
| IBP Inc | 200,000 | 13 |
| Commission on Grads Foreign Nursing Schl | 180,000 | 14 |
| National Assn of Immigration Judges | 160,000 | 15 |
| National Immigration Forum | 160,000 | 15 |
| United to Secure America | 150,000 | 17 |
| United Farm Workers | 120,000 | 18 |
| Assomull Mukesh | 100,000 | 19 |
| US Cmte for Refugees & Immigrants | 90,000 | 20 |
| Eurapair International | 80,000 | 21 |
| Norbrook Laboratories | 80,000 | 21 |
| Banner Health Care | 68,000 | 23 |
| American Business for Legal Immigration | 60,000 | 24 |
| Just Care | 60,000 | 24 |
| Caribbean Marine Service | 40,000 | 26 |
| Council of Jewish Federations | 40,000 | 26 |
| Israel Discount Bank of New York | 40,000 | 26 |
| Pepper Hamilton LLP | 30,000 | 29 |
| St Bernard Hospital | 30,000 | 29 |
| Compete America | 20,000 | 31 |
| Fed of Employers & Workers of America | 20,000 | 31 |
| McKinsey & Co | 20,000 | 31 |
| Six Flags | 20,000 | 31 |
| Victor Alberto Venero Garrido | 20,000 | 31 |
| Washington Soccer Partners | 20,000 | 31 |
| Wu David | 20,000 | 31 |
| Bangladeshi-American Friendship Society | 14,000 | 38 |

Table A1. List of issues in lobbying reports

| Code | Issue | Code | Issue |
|-------------|--|-------------|---|
| ACC | Accounting | MED | Medical/Disease Research/ Clinical Labs |
| ADV | Advertising | MMM | Medicare/Medicaid |
| AER | Aerospace | MON | Minting/Money/ Gold Standard |
| AGR | Agriculture | NAT | Natural Resources |
| ALC | Alcohol & Drug Abuse | PHA | Pharmacy |
| ANI | Animals | POS | Postal |
| APP | Apparel/Clothing Industry/Textiles | RRR | Railroads |
| ART | Arts/Entertainment | RES | Real Estate/Land Use/Conservation |
| AUT | Automotive Industry | REL | Religion |
| AVI | Aviation/Aircraft/ Airlines | RET | Retirement |
| BAN | Banking | ROD | Roads/Highway |
| BNK | Bankruptcy | SCI | Science/Technology |
| BEV | Beverage Industry | SMB | Small Business |
| BUD | Budget/Appropriations | SPO | Sports/Athletics |
| CHM | Chemicals/Chemical Industry | TAX | Taxation/Internal Revenue Code |
| CIV | Civil Rights/Civil Liberties | TEC | Telecommunications |
| CAW | Clean Air & Water (Quality) | TOB | Tobacco |
| CDT | Commodities (Big Ticket) | TOR | Torts |
| COM | Communications/ Broadcasting/ Radio/TV | TRD | Trade (Domestic & Foreign) |
| CPI | Computer Industry | TRA | Transportation |
| CSP | Consumer Issues/Safety/ Protection | TOU | Travel/Tourism |
| CON | Constitution | TRU | Trucking/Shipping |
| CPT | Copyright/Patent/ Trademark | URB | Urban Development/ Municipalities |
| DEF | Defense | UNM | Unemployment |
| DOC | District of Columbia | UTI | Utilities |
| DIS | Disaster Planning/Emergencies | VET | Veterans |
| ECN | Economics/Economic Development | WAS | Waste (hazardous/ solid/ interstate/ nuclear) |
| EDU | Education | WEL | Welfare |
| ENG | Energy/Nuclear | | |
| ENV | Environmental/Superfund | | |
| FAM | Family Issues/Abortion/ Adoption | | |
| FIR | Firearms/Guns/ Ammunition | | |
| FIN | Financial Institutions/Investments/ Securities | | |
| FOO | Food Industry (Safety, Labeling, etc.) | | |
| FOR | Foreign Relations | | |
| FUE | Fuel/Gas/Oil | | |
| GAM | Gaming/Gambling/ Casino | | |
| GOV | Government Issues | | |
| HCR | Health Issues | | |
| HOU | Housing | | |
| IMM | Immigration | | |
| IND | Indian/Native American Affairs | | |
| INS | Insurance | | |
| LBR | Labor Issues/Antitrust/ Workplace | | |
| LAW | Law Enforcement/Crime/ Criminal Justice | | |
| MAN | Manufacturing | | |
| MAR | Marine/Maritime/ Boating/Fisheries | | |
| MIA | Media (Information/ Publishing) | | |

Source: Senate's Office of Public Records (SOPR)

Table A2. Sample Lobbying Report

00000343475

Clerk of the House of Representatives
Legislative Resource Center
B-106 Cannon Building
Washington, DC 20515

Secretary of the Senate
Office of Public Records
232 Hart Building
Washington, DC 20510

RECEIVED
SECRETARY OF THE SENATE
PUBLIC RECORDS

05 AUG 15 PM 12: 53

00000343475

LOBBYING REPORT

Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (Section 5) - All Filers Are Required to Complete This Page

| | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Registrant Name Microsoft Corporation | | | |
| 2. Registrant Address <input type="checkbox"/> Check if different than previously reported Address 1401 Eye Street, NW Suite 500 City Washington State/Zip (or Country) DC 20005 | | | |
| 3. Principal Place of Business (if different from line 2) City Redmond State/Zip (or Country) WA 98052 | | | |
| 4. Contact Name Karin Gess | Telephone (202) 263-5900 | E-mail (optional) kgess@microsoft.com | 5. Senate ID # 25204-12 |
| 7. Client Name <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Self | | | 6. House ID # 31174000 |

TYPE OF REPORT 8. Year 2005 Midyear (January 1-June 30) OR Year End (July 1-December 31)

9. Check if this filing amends a previously filed version of this report

10. Check if this is a Termination Report >> Termination Date _____

11. No Lobbying Activity

INCOME OR EXPENSES - Complete Either Line 12 OR Line 13

| | |
|---|---|
| <p>12. Lobbying Firms</p> <p>INCOME relating to lobbying activities for this reporting period was:</p> <p>Less than \$10,000 <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>\$10,000 or more <input type="checkbox"/> >> \$ _____ (income (nearest \$20,000))</p> <p>Provide a good faith estimate, rounded to the nearest \$20,000 of all lobbying related income from the client (including all payments to the registrant by any other entity for lobbying activities on behalf of the client).</p> | <p>13. Organizations</p> <p>EXPENSES relating to lobbying activities for this reporting period were:</p> <p>Less than \$10,000 <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>\$10,000 or more <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> >> \$ <u>\$4,540,000.00</u> (Expenses (nearest \$20,000))</p> <p>14. REPORTING METHOD. Check box to indicate expense accounting method. See instructions for description of options.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Method A. Reporting amounts using LDA definitions only</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Method B. Reporting amounts under section 6033(b)(8) of the Internal Revenue Code</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Method C. Reporting amounts under section 162(e) of the Internal Revenue Code</p> |
|---|---|

Signature _____ Date 8/12/2005

Printed Name and Title Jack Krumholtz - Managing Dir. of Federal Gov't Affairs Page 1 of 19

Appendix Table A2. Sample Lobbying Report (cont.)

00000343484

Registrant Name: Microsoft Corporation
 Client Name: Microsoft Corporation

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LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Attach additional page(s) as needed.

- 15. General issue area code IMM (one per page)
- 16. Specific Lobbying issues
 - H-1B visas
 - L-1 visas
 - Program Electronic Review Management System (PERM) regulations

- 17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies contacted Check if None
 - Department of Commerce
 - Department of Labor
 - Executive Office of the President
 - House of Representatives
 - Senate

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

| Name | Covered Official Position (if applicable) | New |
|------------------|---|-----|
| Buckner, Marland | | No |
| Corley, Scott | | Yes |
| Gelman, Matt | | No |
| Houston, James | | No |
| Ingle, Ed | White House | No |
| Krumholtz, Jack | | No |
| Otto, Lori | Senate Republican Policy Committee | No |

- 19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above Check if None

Signature _____ Date 8/12/2005

Printed Name and Title Jack Krumholtz - Managing Dir. of Federal Gov't Affairs Page 10 of 19

