

Populism and Civil Society¹

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Abstract

Populists claim to be the only legitimate representative of the people. Does it mean that there is no space for civil society (e.g. unions, other parties, associations?) The issue is important because since the times of de Tocqueville (1835), associations and civil society have been recognized as a key factor in a healthy liberal democracy. We first review the literature on populism and civil society drawing from the political science and economic literature. Second, we ask two questions: 1) do individuals who belong to associations vote less for populist parties? 2) does membership to associations decrease when populist parties are in power? We answer these questions looking at the experiences of Latin America, which has already a long history of populists in power, and Europe, where populist parties are on the rise and there is a rich civil society tradition.

Keywords: Democracy, voting, populist parties, union membership, Europe, Latin America.

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I. Introduction

Populism is not new. Waves of populism have spread through Russia and the U.S. at the end of the XIX century and through several European and Latin American countries in the XX century (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Müller, 2016; Judis, 2016.) In previous episodes, populism remained marginal (like in Europe in the second half of the XX century) or became dominant in weak liberal democracies (like Latin America.) What is peculiar in the recent wave is that populism has spread and sometimes become dominant in countries with well-established liberal democracies. This begs the question of how populism can not only co-exist but even thrive and prosper in liberal democracies.

What is populism? Populism has been defined in various ways and often in the political debate is used as a derogative term. In line with a common view in political science, we use the definitions of populism as “an ideology that considers society ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonist groups, ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’” (Mudde, 2004.) The key issue of interest here is that the populist ideology considers the people as a monolith and populist leaders claim to have the monopoly of the political representation of the people. This monopoly on representing the “people” is almost a moral right which delegitimizes all other parties, associations, and groups in the populist discourse. In the populist view, an (often corrupt) and detached elite is in contrast with the homogenous and virtuous people. In the populists’ Manichean view, there is no intermediate space between the ‘virtuous people’ and the corrupt elites. This view is in contrast with the concept of liberal democracy.

Liberal democracies are political systems based on pluralism where different groups represent different interests and values, which are all legitimate. In liberal democracies, multiple political parties compete in free elections, branches of government are separated, and a system of checks-and-balances exists. Associations are a form to organize and give voice to these different values. Associations play a key role in liberal democracies. Alexis de Tocqueville in his *Democracy in America* (1835) writes on the role of associations in democracies:

“Americans of all ages, all conditions, all minds constantly unite. ... Thus, the most democratic country on earth is found to be, above all, the one where men in our day have most perfected the art of pursuing the object of their common desires in common and have applied this new science to the most objects. Does this result from an accident or could it be that there in fact exists a necessary relation between associations and equality? ... all citizens are independent and weak; they can do almost nothing by themselves, and none of them can oblige those like

themselves to lend them their cooperation. They therefore all fall into impotence if they do not learn to aid each other freely. If men who live in democratic countries had neither the right nor the taste to unite in political goals, their independence would run great risks, but they could preserve their wealth and their enlightenment for a long time; whereas if they did not acquire the practice of associating with each other in ordinary life, civilization itself would be in peril. ... The morality and intelligence of a democratic people would risk no fewer dangers than its business and its industry if the government came to take the place of associations everywhere. ... In democratic countries, the science of association is the mother science; the progress of all the others depends on the progress of that one.” This citation illustrates well the role of associations in well-functioning liberal democracies. In sum, liberal democracies are pluralistic where associations are a key point of aggregation; in contrast, populists consider ‘the people’ as a homogeneous group, which does have to be divided.

But what is the role of associations if the populist leaders are the only legitimate representative of the people? This paper looks at the issue of single individuals’ preferences in a large sample of European and Latin American countries. Are individuals who belong to associations more prone to vote for populist parties? Did the global economic crisis and the Euro area crisis change this relation?

We bring this question to the data. The specific hypothesis we test is whether belonging to a body in civil society (as proxied by belonging to a civic association or a trade union) reduces the probability to vote (as stated in retrospective questions) for a populist party. We use several waves of the European Social Survey, which comprises more than 60,000 individual observations, covering 18 European countries with populist parties for about 15 years, and several waves of LatinBarometro, which covers all major Latin American countries for several years.

This paper makes contributions in three fields. First, our approach is useful to explain one of the puzzles that the diffusion of populism is generally scarcely correlated with economic crisis (Kriese and Pappas, 2015). For instance, despite the deep economic crisis, Ireland and Iceland did not have strong populist movements. On the other hand, Poland, which suffered relatively less during the global financial crisis, has a populist party in power. We investigate how the presence (or absence) of civil society can explain these differences across countries.

Second, there is an ongoing debate about the importance of economic versus cultural and social factors in explaining the rise of populism (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Our approach focusing

on the intermediate bodies argue that these factors need to be complemented as the diffusion of populist ideas depends on the presence of a civil society.

Third, our results provide indirect evidence for the old idea that populism may be the response of a society losing its ‘collective consciousness.’ The idea, which is old in sociology, is that a society needs a system of solidarity between individuals (Durkheim, 1893; Arendt, 1973). When this system breaks down, individuals feel anomia and are ready to support new movements. According to this view, populists gain support after big shocks only if the society does not have enough intermediate institutions which provide an ‘ideological anchor’ to individuals.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature on populism and economics with a focus on the effect of the recent global financial and euro crises. Section III describes the data sources used in the empirical analysis and takes a first look at these data. Section IV discusses the empirical strategy employed followed by Section V that reports and discusses the results. Section VI looks at what happens to union membership when populists go to power. Section VII draws conclusions.

II. Literature review

The literature on the causes and the electoral success of populism is old (Ionesco and Gellner, 1969; Di Tella, 1965) and vast, but so far answers have been elusive for historians or political scientists (Hawkins et al., 2017).² For this paper, we focus on three questions on which economists have focused: 1) what is the role of populism in rich postmodern societies? and why has populism been on the rise even before the global financial crisis? 2) what are the effects of the global financial crisis and, in particular, the euro crisis on politics? 3) why do voters vote for parties which are ultimately against their own interest?

Populism in post-modern societies

The rise of populist parties in Europe since the 1980s has revived the literature on populism in political science. The success of (far right) populist parties in the last thirty years has been remarkable. With the Green parties, the populist far right parties are the only new party family in Europe in the last seventy years and the only one to spread consistently in both Eastern and Western Europe. The reasons for the rise of populist parties are complex, involving both

² Political scientists have worked extensively on populism. Even a simple review of the literature on populism in political science is well beyond the scope of this paper. We quote only few authors whose work is close to our work.

demand and supply factors (Mudde, 2007). A key issue is the revival of populist parties in rich countries where democracy is well established.

Inglehart and Norris (2016) explore two leading explanations. First, the widely-held view that economic insecurity has caused the rise of populism. According to this view, the deep structural transformations of the last fifty years have created economic uncertainty and social malaise, especially amongst the economic losers of these transformations. The second view focuses on cultural backlash. In addition to deep economic changes, the last fifty years have seen profound social transformation; the introduction of new values in the society has caused a reaction in sectors of the population which felt threatened. Using the European Social Survey, Inglehart and Norris (2016) find strong evidence in favour of the cultural backlash hypothesis. This finding suggests that the traditional left-right cleavage, on which politics was based before the 80s, is being substituted by a new cleavage between traditional and progressive values in (post-modern) Western societies. Inglehart and Norris (2016) also find evidence that the support for populist parties comes from small shop keepers and not from low-wage workers and that unemployment status and income are bad predictors of populist votes.

The view that in post-modern societies voting is more affected by cultural factors than by wealth or income is important for this paper. In fact, in a post-modern world, associations, which are part of the individual's cultural world, should play an increasing role in determining voting intentions.

Are voters irrational?

Economists have found it particularly difficult to explain the success of populist parties because support for populism challenges the usual assumption in political economy that individuals act (and vote) following their own interests. Economists have long-maintained that populists in power implement policies that in the long-run damage the whole economy and, particularly, those groups that populists are supposed to favour (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1992; Houle and Kenny, 2016). Why do people vote for populist movements that ultimately go against their own interests? If populism leads to bad economic consequences (as economists assume), why do people support populist parties? This seems to violate the principle of rationality.

Economists provided different answers to this question. Dornbusch and Edwards (1992) argue that (most) voters are short-sighted and often misinformed; this explains why they supported political movements in Latin America that promised wealth for everybody and ignored budget constraints. Acemoglu et al. (2013) argue that populist policies are a signalling device by honest politicians directed to voters who have imperfect information about the politicians. Populist

politicians choose ‘extremist’ policies to signal that they are not beholden to special interest. Di Tella and Rotemberg (2017) add voters’ distaste for ‘betrayal’ to a standard model and argue that voters prefer having incompetent leaders rather than feel betrayed. These explanations have merits, but also the big limit that they do not build on the insights of political science. Finally, Rodrik (2017) argues that populism is a rational response to the shocks caused by globalization.

The views in this debate on the rationality of the voter span a wide range. However, all have the implicit assumption that the individual chooses (rationally or irrationally). Our paper innovates in this respect and shows that associations play a key role in explaining the populist votes.

Economic crises and populism

The global financial crisis (or Great Recession) in 2008/9 and the Euro crisis in 2012 have had unprecedented economic consequences; did the economic crises also cause political crises? After all, political crises and the ascent of Nazism followed the economic crisis in the thirties. Political scientists and economists give different answers to this question.

Rovira, Kaltwasser and Zanotti (2016), state that “in contrast to alarmist reports in the media claiming that the Great Recession is triggering the rise of anger, extremism and protest across Europe, most comparative (party) politics literature on the Great Recession tend to argue that so far the political consequences of the crisis have been limited.” The extended state of welfare is credited for preventing a different outcome than in the 30s. Moreover, the evidence points that the recession itself has not caused a large increase of votes for the French Front Nationale (Mayer, 2014). The discontent caused by the economic crisis seems to have been channelled through retrospective voting (i.e. voters punish incumbents in government irrespective of their ideology). According to this view, the rise of populism after the Great Recession is the continuation of a pre-existing trend of punishment of the ruling class via voting for parties with mostly inexperienced politicians presenting themselves as anti-establishment.

Economists hold the opposite view that the economic crises had profound political effects and, in particular, are fostering populism. Guiso et al. (2017), Algan et al. (2017), the EEAG report (2017), Dustmann et al. (2017) argue that the crises and the attendant economic insecurity undermined trust in institutions, in particular, European institutions.

Contributing to this literature, our paper finds that the crises had indeed an effect on the voting preferences but this was intermediated by associations.

III. Data

This section starts with a brief account of the sources from which data were obtained followed by a first look at basic trends and descriptive statistics.

Sources

Our dataset is at an individual level, and is drawn primarily from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS maps the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour patterns to socio-economic and demographic variables. Data collection is every two years in the surveys, though not all countries and individuals participate in all the waves. Therefore, we have a repeated cross-section rather than a panel. The data measures voting patterns at the individual level. The ESS asks individuals whether they voted in the last Parliamentary election and if they did, which party they voted for. The sample covers 18 European countries over the period 2002-2014 (Table A1).

We also collect data on voting patterns in Latin America from the Latinobarometro. The Latinobarometro is also an individual level survey similar to ESS, though with very limited information, and reduced coverage, relative to the ESS. The Latinobarometro also measures voting behaviour, but asks a different question: if individuals are asked to vote the following Sunday for Parliamentary or Presidential election, which party would they vote for. The data for Latin America is very limited, covering only 17 countries from 1996-2008 with many gaps (Table A1). Given the limited coverage, we exercise caution in interpreting the results for Latin America, and treat them as only suggestive evidence.

To identify populist parties in Europe and Latin America, we follow the recent literature (Inglehart and Norris 2016). Inglehart and Norris classify populist parties based on the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). The CHES uses expert ratings on position of parties on a range of characteristics such as support for traditional values, liberal lifestyles, and multiculturalism, including economic characteristics such as state of the economy, and market deregulation. Inglehart and Norris classify a party as populist if it scores more than 80 points on a standardized 100-point scale built using thirteen selected indicators contained in the CHES. This definition of populist party is time-invariant. We follow the same methodology to classify populist parties in Europe and Latin America. Based on this methodology, we define 28 parties in Europe and 22 parties in Latin America as populist. The list of populist parties is provided in Table A2.

A key variable in our analysis is membership to unions or civil society associations. We construct union membership rate for Europe and Latin America using the ESS and the Latinobarometro respectively. We define an individual to be a member of a union if he/she “has ever been a member of a trade union or similar organization”. Membership of civil society associations is elicited from a question on personal involvement in actions “trying to improve things or help prevent things from going wrong”. We consider members of civil society associations those stating not to have “contacted a politician” or “worked in a political party”, but to have “worked in another organization or association during the last 12 months”.

We use several other socio-economic variables such as age, gender, income, and education. Details of all the variables used in the empirical analysis is provided in Table A3. Table A4 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.

A first look at the data

Before going into the econometric analysis, we analyse the evolution of our key variables over time, and analyse simple correlations. In Europe, we find a clear rise in the demand for populism over time (Figure 1). The share of individuals voting for populist parties increased over time since 2000. For example, on average close to 10 percent of the population voted for populist parties in 2002; the figure increased to close to 15 percent by mid-2000, before beginning to decline again more recently. For Latin America, populism was flat till mid-2000s, but has increased sharply since then. The rise in populism in Europe has coincided with a decline in union membership rates (see relationship for selected countries in Figure 2). In the case of Latin America, on average, union membership rates have increased, and have coincided with a rise in populism.

Do populism and decline in union membership rates go hand in hand, or are they driven by a third factor? We analyse this question more rigorously in the next section using a novel dataset on voting patterns and union membership rates.

IV. Empirical Specification

We set out the empirical analysis by first estimating baseline logit and probit models, followed by an extended specification based on the Heckman model.

Baseline specification

We estimate the drivers of populist vote using linear probability, logit, and probit models. The estimating equation is specified as follows:

$$(1) D_{i,c,t} = \alpha Union_{i,c,t} + \beta Income_{i,c,t} + \gamma Gender_{i,c,t} + \delta Age_{i,c,t} + \mu Education_{i,c,t} + s_c + v_t + s_c * v_t + \varepsilon_{i,t},$$

where $D_{i,c,t}$ is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if individual i in country c at time t votes for a populist party. $Union_{i,c,t}$ takes a value of 1 if the individual is a member of a union, or any other organization. $Income_{i,c,t}$, $Gender_{i,c,t}$, $Age_{i,c,t}$, and $Education_{i,c,t}$ are indicators for income, female, age, and education. We use two indicators of income – (i) first, an indicator, “income sufficient” which takes a value of 1 if the individual responds that her income is sufficient, and 0 otherwise and (ii) second, another indicator, “income difficult”, which takes a value of 1 if the individual responds to be in a difficult income situation, and 0 otherwise. For gender, we use a dummy to indicate that respondent reports she is a female.

We also use two indicators for age – (i) a dummy, “young”, which takes a value of 1 if the individual is below 30 years of age, and 0 otherwise, and (ii) another dummy, “old”, which takes a value of 1 if the individual is aged more than 65. For education, we also distinguish between different categories of education. Specifically, we include two indicators specified as follows: (i) a dummy which takes a value of 1, if the individual has attained secondary education, with xx or more years of completed schooling, and (ii) another dummy which takes a value of 1 if the individual has attained tertiary education, with 16 or more years of completed schooling.

s_i and v_t denote country and time fixed effects respectively. Country fixed effects control for all time-invariant country characteristics that may affect individuals’ preferences to vote for populist or non-populist parties, e.g. historical background, culture, or legal system. Time effects capture any time trends in voting behaviour that are common across countries, e.g. the global financial crisis, or a common rise in populism across the globe.

Importantly, the interactions $s_i * v_t$, capture any observed and unobserved country and time varying characteristics e.g. country-specific trends in populist platforms. In fact, we are the first ones in the literature to control for any unobserved country-specific time trends in populism. In addition, $s_i * v_t$ can also control for any country-specific time trends in union membership rates. The standard errors for the estimated coefficients in all regressions are clustered at the country-level.

Extended specification correcting for sample selection bias

Individuals make two decisions: (i) whether to vote in an election, and (ii) conditional on voting, which party to vote for, whether to vote for a populist party or not. This issue has been recognized in the literature, e.g. in Guiso et. al. 2017, and has been addressed through a two-step Heckman model, to account for the bias that may result from the fact that party choice applies only to voters who turnout to vote.

Following the literature, we estimate a two-step Heckman model. In the first stage, we estimate the probability of participation. In the second stage, we estimate the probability of voting for a populist party. For identification, we need to introduce at least one variable which affects the probability of voting, but does not have a direct effect on the choice of party. We use a novel instrument in the analysis: proxies for lack of awareness about political issues.

We assume that lack of political awareness affects voter turnout, but does not directly impact choice of political party. We use several proxies for lack of political awareness. The proxies are measured by the number of “don’t know” or “no answer” to questions relating to “anything about politics”: (i) TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on average weekday, (ii) how interested in politics, (iii) able to take active role in political group, (iv) confident in own ability to participate in politics, (v) easy to take part in politics, (vi) placement on left right scale, (vii) state of education in country nowadays, (viii) state of health services in country nowadays.

For robustness, we estimate several versions of the Heckman model, using a “don’t know” response to (i)-(iii), and (iv)-(viii), and (i) as separate instruments. Lack of political awareness according to our (untestable) identifying assumption, increases the costs of participation while it does directly affect preferences for populist parties. After conditioning on other individual features, there is no strong a priori reason why this variable ought to be systematically correlated with unobserved determinants of attitudes in favor or against populist parties.

Finally, we also test the robustness of our results to the instrument used by Guiso et. al. (2017). Guiso et. al. (2017) use a measure of the health status of the individual for identification. They assume that while the health status of an individual affects the cost of going to the poll, it would not have a direct effect on people’s preferences for populist or non-populist parties, which heavily dwell on pensions and health policies in their political platforms.

V. Empirical Results

This section first reports results using a large voting dataset from 18 European countries followed by results from a smaller yet quite representative dataset from 17 Latin American countries.

Evidence from European voting data

We first show results for drivers of voting for populists using the ESS. In all specifications, we include membership of unions or civil association, and indicators for age, gender, income, and education. In addition, we control for country and time fixed effects, and interactions between country and time effects which control for any country-specific time trends in populism and union membership rates. Our dataset includes at most 155,962 observations from 18 European countries

Table 1-3 shows the results from estimating Equation (1) by OLS, Probit, and 2-step Heckman respectively. Table 3a reports the estimates from the second stage of Heckman, while Table 3b reports the first stage estimates. Column 1 pools data from all available years from 2002-2014. Columns 2 and 3 report the results when we split the samples between 2002-2010, and 2012-2014. Columns 4-10 show the results for specific years.

Our key variable of interest is membership of a union or a civil society association. The estimated coefficient for this variable is consistently negative across all specifications in Tables 1-3 i.e. individuals who belong to associations are less likely to vote for populist parties. The results, however, are statistically indistinguishable from zero until before the global crisis. The coefficient turns strongly negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero, only post global financial crisis, starting in 2010, and the magnitude of the coefficient increases post 2010. In fact, the coefficient is the strongest in 2012-2014. When we split the sample into two – pre-2010, and post 2012, the coefficient turns from weakly negative to strongly negative and statistically significant. Based on Table 3a, in the post 2012 period, individuals belonging to unions and other associations are 15 percent less likely to vote for populist parties, compared to those not belonging to such associations.

How can we explain the increasing conflict between union membership and populist vote over time? One potential explanation could be that before the crisis this relation was not clear possibly because party discipline was strong, and ideological vote was important. Post crisis, individual beliefs became unhinged. With more unhinged beliefs, people felt more free to vote

for new parties. Unions and associations, on the other hand, provided ideological anchors and voice mechanisms alternative to voting for outsiders. Therefore, individuals who belonged to these associations voted less for populist parties.

There are some other interesting findings as well. Table 3b shows the first stage for the Heckman process. The coefficient on our proxies for lack of political awareness is strongly negative and statistically significant. We find strong evidence that individuals who are less politically aware are less likely to participate in elections, suggesting that lack of political awareness is a strong instrument.

Income affects participation positively. High income individuals are more likely to vote, but less likely to vote populist. Low income individuals are less likely to participate, but has insignificant effect on voting populist, relative to other individuals.

We find that women are less likely to participate, and conditional on voting, they are also less likely to vote for populist parties. The coefficient on women is consistently (and significantly) negative. The relationship between far right populist parties in Europe has been long noted (see Mudde, 2007, for a summary). All evidence points at female underrepresentation in membership and electorate. In the past, authors have noted that women may be discouraged by the fact that far right European parties have conservative values on civil rights, which may be not appealing to many women. More recently, Mudde (2007) has proposed an alternative explanation: women tend to vote conservative parties but dislike extremist parties that are stigmatized as outsiders.³

Age affects participation positively, but conditional on voting, it has an opposite effect on populist vote. For example, older people (>65 years) are more likely to vote, but conditional on participation, they are less likely to vote populist.

Education is considered in the literature to be a proxy for the ability to gauge long term costs of current policies, and is hypothesized to be negatively associated with populist vote. Our results support the significance of education; however, we find interesting variation across different categories of education. Individuals with tertiary education are more likely to participate in elections, but significantly less likely to vote for populist parties. Individuals with secondary education are also more likely to participate in elections relative to those who are not, but they are not significantly less likely to vote populist, unlike the tertiary educated. Therefore, while our

³ This would also explain the different effect of religion on populist voting. In West Europe (Germany and France for instance) where religious authorities have typically stigmatized far-right parties older women with conservative views have voted less for far-right parties. In East Europe (Poland and Slovakia) where religious authorities have stigmatized less far-right parties older women tend to vote more for these parties (Mudde, 2007).

results support the importance of education in determining populist voting patterns, we find that it is only the highly educated who are less likely to vote for populist parties.

Overall, the novel finding is that, over time, populism and membership to associations have moved in opposite directions in Europe. While people increasingly feel free to vote for populist parties, they have also become less tied to unions and associations, with ideological anchors. The rest of the findings are consistent with the literature e.g. Guiso et al. 2017. Women, high income, highly educated, and older individuals, are less likely to vote for populist parties. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that voting for populist parties is less likely among people who are likely to be more economically secure.

Robustness tests

In this section, we conduct robustness checks to analyse whether the coefficient on membership to associations is robust to alternative specifications, explanatory variables, and instruments. Table 4 presents the results. Panel A estimates a logit specification. Panel B uses an alternative definition of membership, to include those individuals who have ever been members of a union in the past. Panels C, D, and E use the selection variables separately rather than together, as in Tables 3a and 3b. Panel F repeats the analysis using the instrument used by Guiso et. al. 2017, i.e. health status of an individual. All regressions in Table 4 include the controls used in Tables 3b. The result that membership of associations is negatively associated with voting for populist parties, over time, and specifically during the post 2012 period, is remarkably robust across different specifications.

Another potential concern is that the estimated coefficient on union membership rates might be driven by specific countries. In Table 5, we repeat the Heckman specification in Table 3a, dropping one country at a time. The regressions include all the controls in Table 3a, but only the coefficient on union membership is shown in Table 5. The estimated coefficients on union membership remain negative and statistically distinguishable from zero post 2012 in all the regressions, implying that our main finding that populism and membership of associations do not go hand in hand over time, is not driven by any particular country. Not only are the sign and significance robust, but the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is also remarkably similar across specifications.

Evidence from Latin American voting data

Next, we show results on drivers of voting for populism for Latin America. As noted above, the data for Latin America has very limited coverage, with much fewer observations compared to

Europe. The data covers only the period from 1996 to 2008, with many gaps. Therefore, we cannot evaluate how the association between union membership and populist vote changed since the global financial crisis. The survey is also not rich enough to allow us to conduct any analysis controlling for sample selection into voting. Also in most Latin American countries voting is compulsory (see Figure 3), making the issue of sample selection less relevant for Latin America. Therefore, these results should be interpreted as being only suggestive, and should be taken with caution.

Table 6 presents the probit estimates of the drivers of populism for Latin America. The specification is identical to that for Europe. All regressions include indicators of income, age, gender, and education, and control for country * time fixed effects. All standard errors clustered at the country level.

The results, however, are qualitatively similar to what we found for Europe. Populist vote and union membership go hand in hand in the earlier part of the sample, but move in opposite direction since 2007. The estimated coefficient on union membership is positive and statistically significant for the sample period from 1996-2005, but turn negative and significant during 2007-2008. In other words, we observe qualitatively similar patterns between Europe and Latin America, albeit with different samples and databases.

Note that under the Latin American voting dataset we do not perform the robustness test by replacing the logit and probit models with the Heckman specification due to lack of data on instruments.

VI. Populists in Power

Do populists in power foster or discourage membership in unions or associations? This section takes up this issue using a novel database on populists in power.⁴ Figure 2 shows the evolution of populist parties and union membership over times for some selected countries – Argentina and Brazil in Latin America, and Spain and Turkey in Europe.⁵ While in Argentina, Brazil, and

⁴ The database was kindly shared by Kirk Hawkins. See Allred, Nathaniel, Kirk A. Hawkins, and Saskia P. Ruth. 2015. The data are created based on a textual analysis of four speeches for each leader-term (campaign, international, ribbon cutting, famous) and the scale runs from 0 to 2, higher numbers meaning a stronger populist discourse in the speech. Therefore, it is a measure of how populist the leader is for whatever he/she is in power.

⁵ For union density we use the “Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts , ICTWSS” (available at http://www.edac.eu/indicators_desc.cfm?v_id=215)

Turkey, populists in power coincided with a decline in union densities, we find no clear correlation for Spain.

We test more rigorously for a possible feedback effect from populism to union membership by estimating the following simple regression:

$$(2) \quad dUnion_{c,t} = aD_{populist,c,t} + v_t + \varepsilon_{c,t},$$

where $dUnion_{c,t}$ is the first difference in union density in country c at time t . $D_{populist,c,t}$ is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1, if the party in power in country c at time t is a populist party. We use the first difference of union densities to filter out any trends in union membership rates.⁶ v_t denotes time fixed effects, and controls for any global shocks that affect all countries e.g. global trends in populism, or in changes in union density. Note that we measure feedback effect from populism to union membership using aggregate data at the country-year level. Therefore, it is different from, and not comparable to specification (1), where we explored the drivers of individual voting patterns, and its association with the likelihood of individuals to join unions. Our sample includes 24 countries across Europe and Latin America, and covers the period 1990-2013 for which data are available.

The results from estimating Equation (2) are shown in Table 7. The estimated coefficient on union density is negative and statistically distinguishable at conventional levels. Union densities are likely to decline by 0.8 percentage points more in countries where populists are in power. Overall, we do find some evidence that populists in power are associated with lower union densities. Therefore, it is not only that members of unions and associations are less likely to vote for populist parties, but we also find some evidence that countries where populists have been in power, union density is lower.

VII. Conclusions

Populism is on the rise in several countries in the world. Researchers have focused on the reasons behind this rise. Previous studies have found that cultural backlash, economic uncertainty, and lack of trust have explanatory power. But no previous study has focused on the role of civil society.

⁶ The findings are qualitatively similar even if we use the union density in levels, and introduce country fixed effects, which implicitly transforms the dependent and explanatory variables into the difference from the mean.

Civil society has long been recognized as a key defence of liberal democracy. de Tocqueville wrote almost two centuries ago, the most common definitions of populism emphasize that populists do not see a role for civil society. However, empirical tests have been lacking. This paper fills this gap.

This paper is also innovative because, different from previous works, it encompasses both Europe and Latin America. This is important because Latin America has a longstanding experience with populist parties in power and the literature in political science has recognized that all populisms have important traits in common despite the obvious differences due to the different geographical areas and right or left orientation. Our results show remarkable similarities in Latin America and Europe, an indication that the issue highlighted in the paper is important in understanding populism.

Finally, this paper also sheds new light on the role of the global financial crisis in the political process. The global financial crisis has not simply caused a populist wave. Rather, it may have changed (and enhanced) the role of civil society. In a world where political systems, institutions, and ideologies have been put into question and even discredited, civil society assumes a new role.

But this paper also opens important questions for future research. First, why the role of associations as vaccine against the populist vote was not important before the global financial crisis? Second, what are the specific mechanisms through which belonging to an association lowers the populist vote? Is it because associations provide alternative information or an ideological anchor? Is it because they offer voice mechanisms alternative to exit-punishment of incumbents? Third, are all associations equivalent or some associations are more effective? Fourth, do associations have a similar impact on all members of society or is belonging to an association more relevant for some groups? Future research should further investigate these issues.

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Table 1. OLS Estimates of Drivers of Populist Party Vote

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
	All	Pre-2010	Post-2012	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014
Union Member	-0.0121 [0.0118]	-0.0049 [0.0154]	-0.0280*** [0.0072]	-0.0021 [0.0205]	-0.0049 [0.0179]	-0.0061 [0.0205]	0.0002 [0.0182]	-0.0114* [0.0060]	-0.0246** [0.0101]	-0.0312*** [0.0068]
Income sufficient	-0.0180*** [0.0057]	-0.0150** [0.0053]	-0.0243*** [0.0083]	-0.0093* [0.0046]	-0.0166* [0.0082]	-0.0173* [0.0081]	-0.0086 [0.0115]	-0.0250** [0.0088]	-0.0227 [0.0131]	-0.0253*** [0.0065]
Income difficult	0.0057 [0.0141]	-0.0033 [0.0152]	0.0246* [0.0131]	-0.0055 [0.0129]	-0.0164 [0.0193]	0.0081 [0.0104]	-0.0061 [0.0258]	0.0031 [0.0179]	0.0236 [0.0192]	0.0261*** [0.0089]
Female	-0.0244*** [0.0053]	-0.0225*** [0.0059]	-0.0280*** [0.0071]	-0.0191* [0.0093]	-0.0257** [0.0088]	-0.0189* [0.0094]	-0.0179** [0.0075]	-0.0310*** [0.0067]	-0.0289*** [0.0079]	-0.0271*** [0.0080]
Young	0.0023 [0.0079]	0.0043 [0.0095]	-0.0021 [0.0073]	-0.0035 [0.0136]	-0.0017 [0.0130]	0.0065 [0.0179]	0.0034 [0.0136]	0.0176 [0.0137]	0.0084 [0.0073]	-0.0136 [0.0104]
Old	-0.0214** [0.0094]	-0.0153 [0.0099]	-0.0327** [0.0115]	-0.0097 [0.0098]	-0.0320* [0.0164]	-0.0093 [0.0067]	-0.0138 [0.0161]	-0.0129 [0.0118]	-0.0328** [0.0149]	-0.0326*** [0.0110]
Secondary education	-0.0224 [0.0217]	-0.0256 [0.0319]	-0.014 [0.0118]	-0.0417 [0.0544]	-0.056 [0.0469]	-0.0157 [0.0274]	-0.0178 [0.0364]	-0.0013 [0.0122]	-0.0286** [0.0132]	0.0006 [0.0150]
Tertiary education	-0.0798*** [0.0261]	-0.0795* [0.0396]	-0.0774*** [0.0143]	-0.086 [0.0661]	-0.1084* [0.0548]	-0.0778* [0.0437]	-0.0711 [0.0453]	-0.0578** [0.0195]	-0.0883*** [0.0166]	-0.0670*** [0.0152]
Country*year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
No. of Observations	1,18,079	80,438	37,641	15,592	15,331	15,989	16,458	17,068	19,065	18,576
R-Squared	0.16	0.13	0.2	0.15	0.15	0.14	0.13	0.09	0.22	0.18

Notes. The dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy=1 if the individual votes for a populist party, and 0 otherwise. “Union member” takes a value of 1 if the individual is a member of a union, or any other organization, and 0 otherwise. “Income sufficient” takes a value of 1 if the individual responds that income is sufficient, and 0 otherwise. “Income difficult” takes a value of 1 if the individual responds to be in a difficult income situation, and 0 otherwise. “Young”, takes a value of 1 if the individual is xxx years of age, and 0 otherwise. “Old” takes a value of 1 if the individual is more than [65] years old, and 0 otherwise. “Secondary education” takes a value of 1, if the individual has attained secondary education, with xx or more years of completed schooling, and 0 otherwise. and (ii) “Tertiary education” takes a value of 1 if the individual has attained tertiary education, with xx or more years of completed schooling. The standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the country-level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 2. Probit Estimates of Drivers of Populist Party Vote

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
	All	Pre-2010	Post-2012	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014
Union Member	-0.0745 [0.0638]	-0.0378 [0.0839]	-0.1532*** [0.0358]	-0.0252 [0.1232]	-0.0382 [0.0959]	-0.056 [0.1150]	-0.0085 [0.0927]	-0.0603* [0.0336]	-0.1329** [0.0546]	-0.1715*** [0.0303]
Income sufficient	-0.1139*** [0.0321]	-0.0977*** [0.0327]	-0.1507*** [0.0377]	-0.0645** [0.0315]	-0.1082** [0.0474]	-0.1094** [0.0506]	-0.0583 [0.0588]	-0.1639*** [0.0491]	-0.1430** [0.0709]	-0.1558*** [0.0324]
Income difficult	0.0388 [0.0716]	-0.0045 [0.0808]	0.1164** [0.0552]	-0.0125 [0.0921]	-0.072 [0.0965]	0.0568 [0.0486]	-0.0155 [0.1256]	0.0175 [0.0935]	0.1105 [0.0830]	0.1264*** [0.0417]
Female	-0.1486*** [0.0382]	-0.1401*** [0.0435]	-0.1646*** [0.0414]	-0.1298* [0.0667]	-0.1582*** [0.0558]	-0.1164* [0.0629]	-0.1023** [0.0475]	-0.1963*** [0.0428]	-0.1700*** [0.0464]	-0.1594*** [0.0436]
Young	0.0184 [0.0408]	0.0314 [0.0498]	-0.0063 [0.0384]	-0.0202 [0.0885]	0.0075 [0.0749]	0.0429 [0.0913]	0.0171 [0.0628]	0.1045 [0.0643]	0.0548 [0.0366]	-0.0787 [0.0598]
Old	-0.1275** [0.0545]	-0.0942* [0.0554]	-0.1828*** [0.0605]	-0.061 [0.0600]	-0.1751** [0.0758]	-0.0711 [0.0439]	-0.0805 [0.0843]	-0.0817 [0.0695]	-0.1894** [0.0807]	-0.1773*** [0.0557]
Secondary education	-0.1191 [0.0923]	-0.1355 [0.1345]	-0.0781 [0.0569]	-0.2052 [0.2183]	-0.2776* [0.1616]	-0.0912 [0.1149]	-0.0954 [0.1679]	-0.0276 [0.0692]	-0.1453** [0.0600]	-0.0113 [0.0779]
Tertiary education	-0.4844*** [0.1053]	-0.4816*** [0.1566]	-0.4730*** [0.0469]	-0.5240** [0.2510]	-0.6103*** [0.1565]	-0.4815*** [0.1868]	-0.4086** [0.2013]	-0.4020*** [0.1053]	-0.5257*** [0.0534]	-0.4232*** [0.0689]
Country*year fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
No. of Observations	1,18,079	80,438	37,641	15,592	15,331	15,989	16,458	17,068	19,065	18,576

Notes. The dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy=1 if the individual votes for a populist party, and 0 otherwise. “Union member” takes a value of 1 if the individual is a member of a union, or any other organization. “Income sufficient” takes a value of 1 if the individual responds that is income is sufficient, and 0 otherwise. “Income difficult” takes a value of 1 if the individual responds to be in a difficult income situation, and 0 otherwise. “Young”, takes a value of 1 if the individual is xxx years of age, and 0 otherwise. “Old” takes a value of 1 if the individual is more than [65] years old, and 0 otherwise. “Secondary education” takes a value of 1, if the individual has attained secondary education, with xx or more years of completed schooling, and 0 otherwise. and (ii) “Tertiary education” takes a value of 1 if the individual has attained tertiary education, with xx or more years of completed schooling. The standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the country-level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 3a. Drivers of Populist Party Vote. Heckman 2nd Stage Estimates

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
	All	Pre-2010	Post-2012	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014
Dependent variable: Vote for Populist Party=1										
Union Member	-0.0748 [0.0637]	-0.0389 [0.0832]	-0.1510*** [0.0348]	-0.0267 [0.1207]	-0.0393 [0.0957]	-0.0559 [0.1149]	-0.0105 [0.0906]	-0.0610* [0.0330]	-0.1324** [0.0545]	-0.1666*** [0.0286]
Income sufficient	-0.1176*** [0.0317]	-0.1087*** [0.0312]	-0.1343*** [0.0418]	-0.0845** [0.0381]	-0.1132** [0.0444]	-0.1082** [0.0490]	-0.0825 [0.0585]	-0.1827*** [0.0490]	-0.1380* [0.0725]	-0.1274*** [0.0382]
Income difficult	0.0455 [0.0661]	0.0182 [0.0703]	0.0879 [0.0661]	0.0251 [0.0712]	-0.0595 [0.0797]	0.0539 [0.0404]	0.0201 [0.1175]	0.0529 [0.0916]	0.1019 [0.0823]	0.0746 [0.0554]
Female	-0.1482*** [0.0384]	-0.1391*** [0.0432]	-0.1670*** [0.0409]	-0.1269* [0.0670]	-0.1578*** [0.0563]	-0.1167* [0.0628]	-0.1004** [0.0478]	-0.1977*** [0.0415]	-0.1714*** [0.0458]	-0.1601*** [0.0426]
Young	0.0308 [0.0479]	0.0738 [0.0640]	-0.0539* [0.0317]	0.0565 [0.1129]	0.0283 [0.1013]	0.0373 [0.0942]	0.0907 [0.0918]	0.1660** [0.0799]	0.0395 [0.0504]	-0.1569*** [0.0558]
Old	-0.1331** [0.0560]	-0.1110* [0.0604]	-0.1553*** [0.0523]	-0.0808 [0.0668]	-0.1823** [0.0821]	-0.0684 [0.0437]	-0.1045 [0.0906]	-0.1167 [0.0769]	-0.1807** [0.0820]	-0.1306*** [0.0469]
Secondary_edu	-0.1243 [0.0938]	-0.1545 [0.1339]	-0.0521 [0.0560]	-0.2379 [0.2109]	-0.2787* [0.1644]	-0.088 [0.1163]	-0.1205 [0.1627]	-0.0685 [0.0670]	-0.1349** [0.0662]	0.0213 [0.0789]
Tertiary_edu	-0.4977*** [0.1004]	-0.5258*** [0.1478]	-0.4123*** [0.0559]	-0.5926** [0.2312]	-0.6281*** [0.1554]	-0.4749** [0.1868]	-0.4755*** [0.1812]	-0.4814*** [0.1111]	-0.5039*** [0.0608]	-0.3329*** [0.0862]
Country*year fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
No. of Observations	1,55,962	1,05,511	50,451	19,610	20,839	20,761	21,512	22,789	25,387	25,064

Notes. This table shows the estimates from the second stage of the Heckman 2-step process. The dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy=1 if the individual votes for a populist party, and 0 otherwise. “Union member” takes a value of 1 if the individual is a member of a union, or any other organization. “Income sufficient” takes a value of 1 if the individual responds that is income is sufficient, and 0 otherwise. “Income difficult” takes a value of 1 if the individual responds to be in a difficult income situation, and 0 otherwise. “Young”, takes a value of 1 if the individual is xxx years of age, and 0 otherwise. “Old” takes a value of 1 if the individual is more than [65] years old, and 0 otherwise. “Secondary education” takes a value of 1, if the individual has attained secondary education, with xx or more years of completed schooling, and 0 otherwise. and (ii) “Tertiary education” takes a value of 1 if the individual has attained tertiary education, with xx or more years of completed schooling. The identifying variables used in the first stage regression includes proxies for lack of political awareness – as captured by “don’t know” in response to any of the questions relating to “anything about politics”: (i) TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on average weekday, (ii) How interested in politics, (iii) Able to take active role in political group, (iv) Confident in own ability to participate in politics, (v) Easy to take part in politics, (vi) Placement on left right scale, (vii) State of education in country nowadays, (viii) State of health services in country nowadays. See Table 3b for results from the first stage regressions. The standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the country-level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 3b. Drivers of Populist Party Vote. Heckman 1st Stage Estimates

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
	All	Pre-2010	Post-2012	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014
Dependent variable: Vote =1										
Number of "don't know" response to "anything about politics"	-0.5171*** [0.0337]	-0.5359*** [0.0409]	-0.4829*** [0.0251]	-0.4909*** [0.0381]	-0.5486*** [0.0549]	-0.5118*** [0.0623]	-0.5672*** [0.0725]	-0.5539*** [0.0435]	-0.5500*** [0.0660]	-0.4354*** [0.0334]
Income sufficient	0.1943*** [0.0301]	0.1866*** [0.0353]	0.2096*** [0.0258]	0.1998*** [0.0548]	0.1315*** [0.0404]	0.1539*** [0.0369]	0.2434*** [0.0404]	0.2037*** [0.0547]	0.1975*** [0.0413]	0.2197*** [0.0259]
Income difficult	-0.2380*** [0.0343]	-0.2429*** [0.0389]	-0.2288*** [0.0346]	-0.2430*** [0.0269]	-0.2790*** [0.0296]	-0.2455*** [0.0559]	-0.2205*** [0.0617]	-0.2303*** [0.0526]	-0.2142*** [0.0403]	-0.2427*** [0.0369]
Female	-0.0035 [0.0197]	0.0122 [0.0236]	-0.0360* [0.0218]	0.0056 [0.0443]	-0.0118 [0.0332]	-0.0061 [0.0306]	0.0164 [0.0264]	0.0511* [0.0301]	-0.0393 [0.0317]	-0.0328 [0.0231]
Young	-0.5226*** [0.0321]	-0.5365*** [0.0379]	-0.4929*** [0.0393]	-0.5900*** [0.0640]	-0.5567*** [0.0648]	-0.5217*** [0.0521]	-0.5497*** [0.0402]	-0.4737*** [0.0531]	-0.4642*** [0.0397]	-0.5237*** [0.0510]
Old	0.2994*** [0.0358]	0.2774*** [0.0382]	0.3420*** [0.0427]	0.2192*** [0.0556]	0.2537*** [0.0485]	0.3129*** [0.0453]	0.2527*** [0.0511]	0.3304*** [0.0474]	0.3177*** [0.0435]	0.3674*** [0.0485]
Secondary education	0.2549*** [0.0393]	0.2490*** [0.0499]	0.2648*** [0.0438]	0.2800*** [0.0562]	0.2563*** [0.0915]	0.2605*** [0.0581]	0.1639** [0.0780]	0.2939*** [0.0688]	0.3218*** [0.0506]	0.2105*** [0.0609]
Tertiary education	0.6368*** [0.0592]	0.6347*** [0.0716]	0.6418*** [0.0606]	0.6626*** [0.0562]	0.6880*** [0.0995]	0.6132*** [0.0825]	0.5631*** [0.1189]	0.6580*** [0.0965]	0.6956*** [0.0605]	0.5914*** [0.0845]
Country*year fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
No. of Observations	1,55,962	1,05,511	50,451	19,610	20,839	20,761	21,512	22,789	25,387	25,064

Notes. This table shows the estimates from the first stage of the Heckman 2-step process. The dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy=1 if the individual votes, and 0 otherwise. The identifying variables used in the first stage regression includes proxies for lack of political awareness – as captured by the total number of “don’t know” in response to any of the questions relating to “anything about politics”: (i) TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on average weekday, (ii) How interested in politics, (iii) Able to take active role in political group, (iv) Confident in own ability to participate in politics, (v) Easy to take part in politics, (vi) Placement on left right scale, (vii) State of education in country nowadays, (viii) State of health services in country nowadays. See Table 3b for results from the first stage regressions. “Union member” takes a value of 1 if the individual is a member of a union, or any other organization. “Income sufficient” takes a value of 1 if the individual responds that is income is sufficient, and 0 otherwise. “Income difficult” takes a value of 1 if the individual responds to be in a difficult income situation, and 0 otherwise. “Young”, takes a value of 1 if the individual is xxx years of age, and 0 otherwise. “Old” takes a value of 1 if the individual is more than [65] years old, and 0 otherwise. “Secondary education” takes a value of 1, if the individual has attained secondary education, with xx or more years of completed schooling, and 0 otherwise. and (ii) “Tertiary education” takes a value of 1 if the individual has attained tertiary education, with xx or more years of completed schooling. The standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the country-level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 4. Drivers of Populist Party Vote: Robustness

	[1] All	[2] Pre-2010	[3] Post-2012
<i>Panel A. Logit</i>			
Union Member	-0.1302 [0.1297]	-0.0529 [0.1695]	-0.3007*** [0.0659]
Observations	1,18,079	80,438	37,641
<i>Panel B. Alternative definition of union</i>			
Current or past union	-0.0774 [0.1051]	-0.0131 [0.1340]	-0.1973** [0.0826]
Observations	1,18,175	80,509	37,666
<i>Panel C. Heckman I: Selection variable. "Don't know" to (i) TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on average, (ii) How interested in politics, (iii) Able to take active role in political group</i>			
Union Member	-0.0721 [0.0593]	-0.0372 [0.0762]	-0.1516*** [0.0347]
Observations	1,55,962	1,05,511	50,451
<i>Panel D. Heckman II: Selection variable. "Don't know" to (i) Confident in own ability to participate in politics, (ii) Easy to take part in politics, (iii) Placement on left right scale, (iv) State of education in country nowadays, (v) State of health services in country nowadays</i>			
Union Member	-0.0749 [0.0637]	-0.039 [0.0831]	-0.1512*** [0.0351]
Observations	1,55,962	1,05,511	50,451
<i>Panel E. Heckman III: Selection variable. "Don't know" to TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on average weekday</i>			
Union Member	-0.0708 [0.0567]	-0.037 [0.0750]	-0.1521*** [0.0352]
Observations	1,55,962	1,05,511	50,451
<i>Panel F. Heckman IV: Selection variable. "Subjective general health"</i>			
Union Member	-0.0748 [0.0630]	-0.0386 [0.0822]	-0.1520*** [0.0357]
Observations	1,55,845	1,05,440	50,405

Notes. This table we conduct robustness checks to analyse whether the coefficient on membership to associations is robust to alternative specifications, explanatory variables, and instruments. Table 4 presents the results. Panel A estimates a logit specification. Panel B uses an alternative definition of membership, to include those individuals who have ever been members of a union in the past. Panels C, D, and E use the selection variables separately rather than together, as in Tables 3a and 3b. Panel E repeats the analysis using the instrument used by Guiso et. al. 2017, i.e. health status of an individual. All regressions in Table 4 include the controls used in Tables 3b.

Table 5. Drivers of Populist Party Vote. Heckman 2nd Stage Estimates. Robustness to Outliers

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
	All	Pre-2010	Post-2012	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014
Dependent variable: Vote for Populist Party=1										
Country Excluded	Coefficient on union member									
None	-0.0748 [0.0637]	-0.0389 [0.0832]	-0.1510*** [0.0348]	-0.0267 [0.1207]	-0.0393 [0.0957]	-0.0559 [0.1149]	-0.0105 [0.0906]	-0.0610* [0.0330]	-0.1324** [0.0545]	-0.1666*** [0.0286]
Austria	-0.0682 [0.0662]	-0.0307 [0.0863]	-0.1489*** [0.0365]	-0.0043 [0.1270]	-0.0384 [0.1018]	-0.0377 [0.1245]	-0.0105 [0.0906]	-0.0610* [0.0330]	-0.1324** [0.0545]	-0.1641*** [0.0316]
Belgium	-0.0934 [0.0670]	-0.0552 [0.0905]	-0.1712*** [0.0306]	-0.0401 [0.1294]	-0.0765 [0.1026]	-0.0721 [0.1279]	-0.024 [0.0982]	-0.0633* [0.0356]	-0.1535*** [0.0540]	-0.1849*** [0.0226]
Bulgaria	-0.0783 [0.0646]	-0.0423 [0.0851]	-0.1547*** [0.0350]	-0.0267 [0.1207]	-0.0393 [0.0957]	-0.0518 [0.1168]	-0.0145 [0.0966]	-0.0767*** [0.0292]	-0.1397** [0.0548]	-0.1666*** [0.0286]
Switzerland	-0.0545 [0.0647]	-0.0158 [0.0865]	-0.1348*** [0.0326]	0.0109 [0.1262]	-0.0059 [0.0989]	-0.0375 [0.1217]	0.0021 [0.0961]	-0.0458 [0.0319]	-0.1098** [0.0524]	-0.1561*** [0.0287]
Czech	-0.0694 [0.0679]	-0.0304 [0.0903]	-0.1487*** [0.0362]	-0.0199 [0.1340]	-0.0217 [0.1068]	-0.0559 [0.1149]	0.0058 [0.0994]	-0.0544 [0.0364]	-0.1255** [0.0579]	-0.1683*** [0.0292]
Germany	-0.0752 [0.0667]	-0.0395 [0.0860]	-0.1539*** [0.0374]	-0.0303 [0.1234]	-0.0365 [0.0999]	-0.0485 [0.1175]	-0.0126 [0.0938]	-0.0693** [0.0327]	-0.1414** [0.0558]	-0.1655*** [0.0323]
Denmark	-0.0659 [0.0676]	-0.0285 [0.0881]	-0.1457*** [0.0375]	-0.0295 [0.1286]	-0.028 [0.1004]	-0.0409 [0.1213]	0.0107 [0.0929]	-0.0535 [0.0356]	-0.1205** [0.0577]	-0.1665*** [0.0313]
Estonia	-0.0781 [0.0648]	-0.0409 [0.0851]	-0.1560*** [0.0348]	-0.0267 [0.1207]	-0.0448 [0.0999]	-0.0619 [0.1184]	-0.0056 [0.0912]	-0.0645* [0.0340]	-0.1401** [0.0547]	-0.1693*** [0.0287]
Finland	-0.0703 [0.0673]	-0.0349 [0.0858]	-0.1522*** [0.0393]	-0.0204 [0.1216]	-0.0297 [0.0973]	-0.0465 [0.1163]	-0.0074 [0.0949]	-0.0710** [0.0329]	-0.1457** [0.0603]	-0.1568*** [0.0309]
France	-0.0723 [0.0663]	-0.0357 [0.0854]	-0.1534*** [0.0373]	-0.0267 [0.1207]	-0.0393 [0.0957]	-0.0536 [0.1228]	-0.0057 [0.0932]	-0.0532 [0.0336]	-0.1335** [0.0583]	-0.1703*** [0.0304]
UK	-0.0724 [0.0642]	-0.0389 [0.0832]	-0.1451*** [0.0352]	-0.0267 [0.1207]	-0.0393 [0.0957]	-0.0559 [0.1149]	-0.0105 [0.0906]	-0.0610* [0.0330]	-0.1324** [0.0545]	-0.1561*** [0.0285]
Hungary	-0.0706 [0.0650]	-0.037 [0.0844]	-0.1447*** [0.0361]	-0.0242 [0.1217]	-0.037 [0.0962]	-0.0572 [0.1160]	-0.0111 [0.0914]	-0.0565 [0.0344]	-0.1210** [0.0560]	-0.1651*** [0.0302]
Italy	-0.0719 [0.0642]	-0.0389 [0.0832]	-0.1439*** [0.0351]	-0.0267 [0.1207]	-0.0393 [0.0957]	-0.0559 [0.1149]	-0.0105 [0.0906]	-0.0610* [0.0330]	-0.1154** [0.0552]	-0.1666*** [0.0286]
Lithuania	-0.0736 [0.0645]	-0.0395 [0.0839]	-0.1453*** [0.0347]	-0.0267 [0.1207]	-0.0393 [0.0957]	-0.0559 [0.1149]	-0.0105 [0.0906]	-0.0652* [0.0335]	-0.1235** [0.0550]	-0.1636*** [0.0288]
Netherlands	-0.0747 [0.0737]	-0.0366 [0.0963]	-0.1557*** [0.0402]	-0.0455 [0.1413]	-0.0314 [0.1065]	-0.0436 [0.1274]	-0.0034 [0.1065]	-0.0619 [0.0400]	-0.1427** [0.0623]	-0.1662*** [0.0330]
Norway	-0.04 [0.0630]	0.0051 [0.0806]	-0.1432*** [0.0372]	0.0496 [0.1104]	0.0034 [0.0970]	-0.005 [0.1161]	0.03 [0.0892]	-0.0496 [0.0362]	-0.1226** [0.0587]	-0.1607*** [0.0309]
Poland	-0.0863 [0.0668]	-0.0478 [0.0880]	-0.1680*** [0.0324]	-0.0385 [0.1273]	-0.0451 [0.0996]	-0.0615 [0.1236]	-0.0156 [0.0976]	-0.0727** [0.0331]	-0.1617*** [0.0503]	-0.1723*** [0.0290]
Sweden	-0.1283*** [0.0449]	-0.1148** [0.0515]	-0.1509*** [0.0372]	-0.1343 [0.0890]	-0.1212* [0.0707]	-0.1742*** [0.0554]	-0.0986** [0.0494]	-0.054 [0.0343]	-0.1195** [0.0566]	-0.1770*** [0.0282]

Notes. This table shows the estimates from the second stage of the Heckman 2-step process. The dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy=1 if the individual votes for a populist party, and 0 otherwise. “Union member” takes a value of 1 if the individual is a member of a union, or any other organization. “Income sufficient” takes a value of 1 if the individual responds that income is sufficient, and 0 otherwise. “Income difficult” takes a value of 1 if the individual responds to be in a difficult income situation, and 0 otherwise. “Young”, takes a value of 1 if the individual is xxx years of age, and 0 otherwise. “Old” takes a value of 1 if the individual is more than [65] years old, and 0 otherwise. “Secondary education” takes a value of 1, if the individual has attained secondary education, with xx or more years of completed schooling, and 0 otherwise. and (ii) “Tertiary education” takes a value of 1 if the individual has attained tertiary education, with xx or more years of completed schooling. The identifying variables used in the first stage regression includes proxies for lack of political awareness – as captured by “don’t know” in response to any of the questions relating to “anything about politics”: (i) TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on average, (ii) How interested in politics, (iii) Able to take active role in political group, (iv) Confident in own ability to participate in politics, (v) Easy to take part in politics, (vi) Placement on left right scale, (vii) State of education in country nowadays, (viii) State of health services in country nowadays. See Table 3b for results from the first stage regressions. The standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the country-level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 6. Probit Estimates of Drivers of Populist Party Vote: Latin America

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
	All	1996 98	2005, 2007, 2008	1996 98 2005	2007 08	1996	1998	2005	2007	2008
Union Member	-0.0218 [0.0370]	0.0122 [0.0352]	-0.0336 [0.0445]	0.0800** [0.0340]	-0.1028** [0.0452]	-0.0411 [0.0637]	0.0731 [0.0641]	0.1789*** [0.0379]	-0.1221** [0.0492]	-0.0888 [0.0652]
Income sufficient	-0.0236 [0.0524]	-0.1660*** [0.0546]	0.0279 [0.0661]	-0.0740*** [0.0263]	0.0197 [0.0836]	-0.2807*** [0.0801]	-0.0952 [0.1267]	0.0461 [0.0658]	0.0895 [0.0842]	-0.0541 [0.1154]
Income difficult	0.0683** [0.0311]	0.1090*** [0.0259]	0.0469 [0.0354]	0.0882*** [0.0264]	0.0528 [0.0446]	0.1223*** [0.0475]	0.0997*** [0.0327]	0.0212 [0.0669]	0.0354 [0.0535]	0.0677 [0.0649]
Female	-0.0275 [0.0331]	-0.0807* [0.0423]	-0.0042 [0.0398]	-0.0459 [0.0376]	-0.0116 [0.0391]	-0.0459 [0.1359]	-0.1081** [0.0430]	0.0223 [0.0890]	-0.0019 [0.0446]	-0.0203 [0.0454]
Young	0.0752 [0.0472]	0.0825 [0.0593]	0.0709 [0.0508]	0.0587 [0.0478]	0.0924 [0.0614]	0.0774 [0.0872]	0.0827 [0.0603]	0.0124 [0.0642]	-0.0192 [0.0498]	0.1771** [0.0871]
Old	-0.1413** [0.0673]	-0.4961*** [0.0483]	-0.0832 [0.0751]	-0.2456*** [0.0482]	-0.0917 [0.0786]	-0.5007*** [0.1206]	-0.4920*** [0.1339]	-0.0635 [0.1094]	-0.2334 [0.1594]	0.0067 [0.1043]
Secondary education	0.0735 [0.0471]	0.1105 [0.0759]	0.0515 [0.0566]	0.1091 [0.0712]	0.042 [0.0592]	0.1074 [0.1748]	0.1110*** [0.0356]	0.0848 [0.0989]	0.0534 [0.1101]	0.0272 [0.0650]
Tertiary education	0.0314 [0.1165]	-0.1059 [0.1537]	0.0996 [0.1485]	0.0406 [0.1427]	0.0215 [0.1366]	-0.1662 [0.3274]	-0.047 [0.0872]	0.3567* [0.2065]	-0.005 [0.1716]	0.0416 [0.1394]
Country*year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
No. of Observations	18,736	4,584	14,152	8,236	10,500	1,890	2,694	3,652	4,453	6,047

Notes. The dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy=1 if the individual votes for a populist party, and 0 otherwise. “Union member” takes a value of 1 if the individual is a member of a union, or any other organization, and 0 otherwise. “Income sufficient” takes a value of 1 if the individual responds that is income is sufficient, and 0 otherwise. “Income difficult” takes a value of 1 if the individual responds to be in a difficult income situation, and 0 otherwise. “Young”, takes a value of 1 if the individual is xxx years of age, and 0 otherwise. “Old” takes a value of 1 if the individual is more than [65] years old, and 0 otherwise. “Secondary education” takes a value of 1, if the individual has attained secondary education, with xx or more years of completed schooling, and 0 otherwise. and (ii) “Tertiary education” takes a value of 1 if the individual has attained tertiary education, with xx or more years of completed schooling. The standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the country-level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.





Table 7. OLS Estimates: Populist Parties in Power and Union Membership

Dependent variable: First difference in union density at (country, year) level

Populist party in power	-0.759** (0.377)
Observations	482
R-squared	0.104

Notes. The dependent variable in all regressions is the first difference in union density at (country, year) level. “Union density” is defined as the share of individuals who are a member of a union, or any other organization. “Populist party in power” takes a value of 1 if there is a populist party in power, and 0 otherwise. The standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the country-level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Figure 1: Vote for Populism and Union Membership Over Time



**Figure 2. Populist Parties in Power and Union Membership:
Selected Countries**








Figure 3. Compulsory voting in the world



Source: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout/compulsory-voting>

Table A1. Data Coverage**European Sample**

Country	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014
Austria	Y	Y	Y				Y
Belgium	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bulgaria			Y	Y	Y	Y	
Czech	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
Denmark	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Estonia		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Finland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
France			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Germany	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hungary	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Italy						Y	
Lithuania					Y	Y	Y
Netherlands	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Norway	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Poland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sweden	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Switzerland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
UK							Y

Table A1. Data Coverage (continued)**Latin American Sample**

Country	1996	1998	2005	2007	2008
Argentina	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bolivia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brazil	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chile	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Colombia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Costa Rica		Y	Y	Y	Y
Dominican Rep.			Y	Y	Y
Ecuador	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
El Salvador	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guatemala	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Honduras	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mexico	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Panama	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Paraguay	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Peru	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uruguay	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Venezuela	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Table A2. Variables and Description

Variable	Description
Populist Vote	=1 if someone votes to a populist party. For ESS, populist party based on Professor Boeri's list. For LAC, populist party defined as the top 25% in CHES score.
Union Member	For ESS, =1 if someone is a current union member, or worked in another organisation or association last 12 months. For ESS, =1 if someone mentioned to worked in any organisation or association.
Income sufficient	=1 if someone feels living comfortably on present income.
Income difficult	=1 if someone feels difficult or very difficult on present income.
Female	=1 if gender is female
Young	=1 if age < 30
Old	=1 if age >= 65
Secondary edu	=1 if someone finished secondary education but not tertiary education.
Tertiary edu	=1 if someone finished tertiary education
Sum Don't Know	number of "Don't Know" to a list of 8 questions, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on average • How interested in politics • Able to take active role in political group • Confident in own ability to participate in politics • Easy to take part in politics • Placement on left right scale • State of education in country nowadays • State of health services in country nowadays

Table A3. List of Populist Parties in Europe

Country	Populist Parties
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria Alliance for the Future of Austria
Belgium	Vlaams Belang Parti Populaire
Bulgaria	Ataka VMRO- Bulgarian National Movement
Czech	Dawn of Direct Democracy
Denmark	Danish People's Party
Estonia	Conservative People's Party of Estonia
Finland	True Finns
France	National Front Movement for France
Germany	Alternative for Germany National Democratic Party of Germany
Hungary	Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union Movement for a Better Hungary
Italy	Five Star Movement The People of Freedom Lega Nord
Lithuania	Party Order and Justice
Netherlands	Party for Freedom Socialist Party
Norway	Progress Party
Poland	Law and Justice Congress of the New Right
Sweden	Sweden Democrats
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party
UK	UK Independence Party

Table A3 (contd.). List of Populist Parties in Latin America

Country	Populist Parties
Argentina	Frente para la Victoria (FPV)
Argentina	Partido Socialista (PS)
Argentina	Unión Cívica Radical (UCR)
Bolivia	Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR)
Bolivia	Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)
Brazil	Democratas (DEM) (ex-PFL)
Brazil	Partido Comunista do Brasil (PC do B)
Brazil	Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT)
Brazil	Partido Popular Socialista (PPS)
Brazil	Partido Progressista Brasileiro (PPB)
Brazil	Partido Republicano Brasileiro (PRB)
Brazil	Partido Social Cristiano (PSC)
Brazil	Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL)
Brazil	Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB)
Brazil	Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB)
Brazil	Partido Verde (PV)
Brazil	Partido da República (PR)
Brazil	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB)
Brazil	Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB)
Brazil	Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)
Chile	Partido Comunista (PC)
Chile	Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC)
Chile	Partido Humanista (PH)
Chile	Partido Radical Social Democrático (PRSD)
Chile	Partido Socialista (PS)
Chile	Renovación Nacional (RN)
Colombia	Partido Cambio Radical (CR)
Colombia	Partido Conservador Colombiano (PCC)
Colombia	Partido Liberal Colombiano (PLC)
Colombia	Partido Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA)
Colombia	Partido Social de Unidad Nacional, Partido de la U
Costa Rica	Movimiento Libertario (ML)
Costa Rica	Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC)
Costa Rica	Partido Renovación Costarricense (PRC)
Costa Rica	Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC)
Costa Rica	Partido de Liberación Nacional (PLN)
Dominican Republic	Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC)
Dominican Republic	Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD)
Dominican Republic	Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD)
Ecuador	Movimiento Alianza País
Ecuador	Movimiento Pachakutik (PK)
Ecuador	Movimiento Popular Democrático (MPD)

Ecuador	Partido Renovador Inst. Acción Nacional (PRIAN)
Ecuador	Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE)
Ecuador	Partido Social Cristiano (PSC)
Ecuador	Partido Socialista-Frente Amplio (PS-FA)
Ecuador	Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero
Guatemala	Encuentro por Guatemala
Guatemala	Gran Alianza Nacional (GANAN)
Guatemala	Partido Patriota (PP)
Guatemala	Partido Unionista (PU)
Guatemala	Unidad Nacional de Esperanza (UNE)
Guatemala	Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)
Guatemala	Unión del Cambio Nacional (UCN)
Honduras	Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Honduras (PDCH)
Honduras	Partido Liberal (PL)
Honduras	Partido Nacional de Honduras (PNH)
Honduras	Partido de Unión Democrática (PUD)
Mexico	Partido Acción Nacional (PAN)
Mexico	Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)
Mexico	Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)
Mexico	Partido Verde Ecologista de México (PVEM)
Mexico	Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD)
Mexico	Partido del Trabajo (PT)
Nicaragua	Partido Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (ALN)
Nicaragua	Partido Conservador (PC)
Nicaragua	Partido Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN)
Nicaragua	Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC)
Nicaragua	Partido Resistencia Nicaragüense (PRN)
Panama	Movimiento Liberal Republicano Nacionalista (MOLIRENA)
Panama	Partido Cambio Democrático (CD)
Panama	Partido Panameñista
Panama	Partido Popular (PP)
Panama	Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD)
Peru	Acción Popular (AP)
Peru	Partido Aprista Peruano (PAP)
Peru	Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP)
Peru	Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC)
Peru	Perú Posible (PC)
Peru	Restauración Nacional (RN)
Peru	Somos Perú (SP)
Peru	Unión por el Perú (UPP)
Peru	Unión por el Perú / Partido Nacionalista Peruano
Paraguay	Asociación Nacional Republicana (ANR)
Paraguay	Partido Democrático Progresista (PDP)
Paraguay	Partido Encuentro Nacional (PEN)
Paraguay	Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA)

Paraguay	Partido País Solidario (PPS)
Paraguay	Partido del Movimiento al Socialismo (PMAS)
El Salvador	Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FML)
El Salvador	Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC)
El Salvador	Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN)
Uruguay	Frente Amplio (FA)
Uruguay	Partido Colorado (PC)
Uruguay	Partido Independiente (PI)
Uruguay	Partido Nacional (PN)
Venezuela	Acción Democrática (AD)
Venezuela	Comite de Organización Política Electoral Independ (COPE)
Venezuela	Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)
Venezuela	Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV)
Venezuela	Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV)
Venezuela	Patria Para Todos (PPT)
Venezuela	Por la Democracia Social (PODEMOS)
Venezuela	Primero Justicia (PJ)
Venezuela	Proyecto Venezuela (PV)
Venezuela	Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT)

Table A4. Summary Statistics

Variable	ESS		LAC	
	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.
Populist Vote	0.13	0.33	0.22	0.42
Union Member	0.41	0.49	0.55	0.50
Income sufficient	0.36	0.48	0.09	0.29
Income difficult	0.19	0.39	0.52	0.50
Female	0.52	0.50	0.49	0.50
Young	0.12	0.32	0.35	0.48
Old	0.24	0.43	0.08	0.27
Secondary education	0.62	0.49	0.21	0.41
Tertiary education	0.32	0.47	0.07	0.26